Чеченская война вторая компания википедия

This article is about the war during the period of 1999–2000. For the following conflict in North Caucasus, see Insurgency in the North Caucasus.

Second Chechen War
Part of the Chechen–Russian conflict and Post-Soviet conflicts
A BTR-80 armored personnel carrier disabled by militants during the 2000 Zhani-Vedeno ambush
Date Major combat phase: 7 August 1999 – 30 April 2000[8] (8 months and 24 days) Insurgency phase: 1 May 2000 – 16 April 2009[9] (8 years, 11 months and 15 days) Location North Caucasus, mainly Chechnya and Dagestan Spillovers in Georgia Suicide attacks across Russia Result Russian victory Low-level insurgency continued until 2017 Territorial changes Chechnya reincorporated into Russia
Belligerents
Russia Provisional Council (until 2000) Chechen Republic (since 2009)	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1999–2007) Caucasian Front (2005–2007) Caucasus Emirate (2007–2009) Foreign volunteers: Mujahideen[1][2][3][4] Grey Wolves[5][6][7]
Commanders and leaders
Boris Yeltsin[a] Vladimir Putin[b] Vladimir Shamanov Igor Sergeyev Anatoly Kvashnin Viktor Kazantsev Nikolai Patrushev Gennady Troshev German Ugryumov Mikhail Malofeev † Mikhail Rudchenko [ru] † Nikolai Garidov [ru] † Igor Shifrin [ru] † Pavel Varfolomeev [ru] † Gennady Shpigun † Gaidar Gadzhiyev † Akhmad Kadyrov X Ramzan Kadyrov Alu Alkhanov	Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev X Aslan Maskhadov † Abdul Halim Sadulayev † Shamil Basayev † Dokka Umarov Ruslan Gelayev † Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov † Ramzan Akhmadov † Vakha Arsanov † Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev † Akhmed Zakayev Aslanbek Ismailov [ru] † Arbi Barayev † Ibn al-Khattab † Abu al-Walid † Abu Hafs al-Urduni  † Muhannad Abdullah al-Kurdi
Strength
Russian claim: 80,000 (in 1999)[10]	9,000 (in 1999)[11] 7,000 (in 2000)[11] Russian claim: ~22,000[12]
Casualties and losses
Independent estimates: 9,000–11,000 killed (1999-Feb. 2002; Janes)[13] 4,749 killed (Aug. 2002-Aug. 2003; IISS)[14] 14,000 killed (1999-March 2005; Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers)[15] Russian claim: 7,268–7,476 killed[16][17][18][19]	Chechen claim:[c] 3,170+ killed (1999–2004)[20] Russian claim: 16,299 killed (1999–2009)[21][22]
Civilian casualties Estimate total number of casualties: 30,000 civilians dead (25,000 killed and 5,000 disappeared) according to AI[23] ~80,000 killed in Chechnya (GfbV estimate)[24] More in neighbouring regions 40,000–45,000 civilians killed (Kramer)[25] More than 600 killed during attacks in Russia proper. Total killed military/civilian: ~50,000–80,000

The Second Chechen War (Russian: Втора́я чече́нская война́, Chechen: ШолгIа оьрсийн-нохчийн тӀом, lit. ‘Second Russian-Chechen War’^[26]) took place in Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, from August 1999 to April 2009. In August 1999, Islamist fighters from Chechnya infiltrated Russia’s Dagestan region, violating Russia’s borders. During the initial campaign, Russian military and pro-Russian Chechen paramilitary forces faced Chechen separatists in open combat and seized the Chechen capital Grozny after a winter siege that lasted from December 1999 until February 2000. Russia established direct rule over Chechnya in May 2000 although Chechen militant resistance throughout the North Caucasus region continued to inflict heavy Russian casualties and challenge Russian political control over Chechnya for several years. Both sides carried out attacks against civilians. These attacks drew international condemnation.

In mid-2000, the Russian government transferred certain military responsibilities to pro-Russian Chechen forces. The military phase of operations was terminated in April 2002, and the coordination of the field operations was given first to the Federal Security Service and then to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the summer of 2003.

By 2009, Russia had severely disabled the Chechen separatist movement and large-scale fighting ceased. Russian army and Interior Ministry troops ceased patrolling. Grozny underwent reconstruction efforts and much of the city and surrounding areas were rebuilt quickly. Sporadic violence continued in the North Caucasus; occasional bombings and ambushes against federal troops and forces of the regional governments in the area still occur.^[27][28]

In April 2009, the government operation in Chechnya officially ended.^[9] As the bulk of the army was withdrawn, responsibility for dealing with the low-level insurgency was shouldered by the local police force. Three months later, the exiled leader of the separatist government, Akhmed Zakayev, called for a halt to armed resistance against the Chechen police force from August and said he hoped that «starting with this day Chechens will never shoot at each other».^[29] This marked the end of the Chechen conflict. The death toll of the conflict is unknown, although the total loss of human life, including both combatants and non-combatants, is estimated to be over 60,000.

Names[edit]

The Second Chechen War is also known as the Second Chechen Campaign (Russian: Втора́я чече́нская кампа́ния)^[d][30] or the Second Russian Invasion of Chechnya from the rebel Chechen point of view.

Historical basis of the conflict[edit]

Russian Empire[edit]

Chechnya is an area in the Northern Caucasus which has constantly fought against foreign rule, including the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century. The Russian Terek Cossack Host was established in lowland Chechnya in 1577 by free Cossacks who were resettled from the Volga to the Terek River. In 1783, the Russian Empire and the Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, under which Kartli-Kakheti became a Russian protectorate.^[31] To secure communications with Georgia and other regions of the Transcaucasia, the Russian Empire began spreading its influence into the Caucasus region, starting the Caucasus War in 1817. Russian forces first moved into highland Chechnya in 1830, and the conflict in the area lasted until 1859, when a 250,000-strong army under General Aleksandr Baryatinsky broke down the highlanders’ resistance. Frequent uprisings in the Caucasus also occurred during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78.

Soviet Union[edit]

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chechens established a short-lived Caucasian Imamate which included parts of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia; there was also the secular pan-Caucasian Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus.^[32] The Chechen states were opposed^{[citation needed]} by both sides of the Russian Civil War and most of the resistance was crushed by Bolshevik troops by 1922. Then, months before the creation of the Soviet Union, the Chechen Autonomous Oblast of the Russian SFSR was established. It annexed a part of territory of the former Terek Cossack Host. Chechnya and neighboring Ingushetia formed the Checheno–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936. In 1941, during World War II, a Chechen revolt broke out, led by Hasan Israilov. In 1944, Chechens were deported to the Kazakh SSR and Kirghiz SSR in an act of ethnic cleansing; this was done under the false pretext of Chechen mass collaboration with Nazi Germany. An estimated 1/4 to 1/3 of the Chechen population perished due the harsh conditions.^[33][34][35] Many scholars recognize the deportation as an act of genocide, as did the European Parliament in 2004.^[36][37][38] In 1992 the separatist government built a memorial dedicated to the victims of the acts of 1944. The pro-Russian government would later demolish this memorial.^[39][40] Tombstones which were an integral part of the memorial were found planted on the Akhmad Kadyrov Square next to granite steles honoring the losses of the local pro-Russian power.^[41]

First Chechen War[edit]

During the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya declared independence. In 1992, Chechen and Ingush leaders signed an agreement splitting the joint Checheno–Ingush republic in two, with Ingushetia joining the Russian Federation and Chechnya remaining independent. The tension between Chechnya and Russia over independence ultimately led to Russian intervention in the republic, in which the Russians covertly tried to oust the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. The First Chechen War began in 1994, when Russian forces entered Chechnya on the premise of restoring constitutional order. Following nearly two years of brutal fighting, with a death toll exceeding 100,000 by some estimates, the 1996 Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement was signed and Russian troops were withdrawn from the republic.^[42]

Prelude to the Second Chechen War[edit]

Chaos in Chechnya[edit]

Following the first war, the government’s grip on Chechnya was weak, especially outside the ruined capital Grozny. The areas controlled by separatist groups grew larger and the country became increasingly lawless.^{[citation needed]} The war ravages and lack of economic opportunities left large numbers of heavily armed and brutalized former separatist fighters unemployed. The authority of the government in Grozny was opposed by extremist warlords like Arbi Barayev, who according to some sources was in cooperation with the FSB.^[43] Chechen warlords had been steadily increasing abductions and raids into other parts of the Northern Caucasus.^[44] In place of the devastated economic structure, kidnapping emerged as the principal source of income countrywide, procuring over $200 million during the three-year independence of Chechnya.^[45] It has been estimated that up to 1,300 people were kidnapped in Chechnya between 1996 and 1999,^{[citation needed]} and in 1998, a group of four Western hostages was murdered. In 1998, a state of emergency was declared by the authorities in Grozny. Tensions led to open clashes like the July 1998 confrontation in Gudermes, in which some 50 people died in fighting between Chechen National Guard troops and the Islamist militias.

Russian–Chechen relations (1996–1999)[edit]

Political tensions were fueled in part by allegedly Chechen or pro-Chechen terrorist and criminal activity in Russia, as well as by border clashes. On 16 November 1996, in Kaspiysk (Dagestan), a bomb destroyed an apartment building housing Russian border guards, killing 68 people. The cause of the blast was never determined, but many in Russia blamed Chechen separatists.^[46] Three people died on 23 April 1997, when a bomb exploded in the Russian railway station of Armavir (Krasnodar Krai), and two on 28 May 1997, when another bomb exploded in the Russian railway station of Pyatigorsk (Stavropol Krai). On 22 December 1997, forces of Dagestani militants and Chechnya-based Arab warlord Ibn al-Khattab raided the base of the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army in Buynaksk, Dagestan, inflicting heavy casualties.^[47]

The 1997 election brought to power the separatist president Aslan Maskhadov. In 1998 and 1999, President Maskhadov survived several assassination attempts,^[48] blamed on the Russian intelligence services. In March 1999, General Gennady Shpigun, the Kremlin’s envoy to Chechnya, was kidnapped at the airport in Grozny and ultimately found dead in 2000 during the war. On 7 March 1999, in response to the abduction of General Shpigun, Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin called for an invasion of Chechnya. However, Stepashin’s plan was overridden by the prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov.^[49] Stepashin later said:^[50]

The decision to invade Chechnya was made in March 1999… I was prepared for an active intervention. We were planning to be on the north side of the Terek River by August–September [of 1999] This [the war] would happen regardless to the bombings in Moscow… Putin did not discover anything new. You can ask him about this. He was the director of FSB at this time and had all the information.^[51][52]

According to Robert Bruce Ware, these plans should be regarded as contingency plans. However, Stepashin did actively call for a military campaign against Chechen separatists in August 1999 when he was the prime minister of Russia. But shortly after his televised interview where he talked about plans to restore constitutional order in Chechnya, he was replaced in the PM’s position by Vladimir Putin.^[53]

In late May 1999, Russia announced that it was closing the Russian-Chechnya border in an attempt to combat attacks and criminal activity; border guards were ordered to shoot suspects on sight. On 18 June 1999, seven servicemen were killed when Russian border guard posts were attacked in Dagestan. On 29 July 1999, the Russian Interior Ministry troops destroyed a Chechen border post and captured an 800-meter section of strategic road. On 22 August 1999, 10 Russian policemen were killed by an anti-tank mine blast in North Ossetia, and, on 9 August 1999, six servicemen were kidnapped in the Ossetian capital Vladikavkaz.

Invasion of Dagestan[edit]

The Invasion of Dagestan was the trigger for the Second Chechen War. On 7 August 1999, Shamil Basayev (in association with the Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab, Commander of the Mujahedeen) led two armies of up to 2,000 Chechen, Dagestani, Arab and international mujahideen and Wahhabist militants from Chechnya into the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. This war saw the first (unconfirmed) use of aerial-delivered fuel air explosives (FAE) in mountainous areas, notably in the village of Tando.^[54] By mid-September 1999, the militants were routed from the villages they had captured and pushed back into Chechnya. At least several hundred militants were killed in the fighting; the Federal side reported 275 servicemen killed and approximately 900 wounded.^[55]

Bombings in Russia[edit]

Before the wake of the Dagestani invasion had settled, a series of bombings took place in Russia (in Moscow and in Volgodonsk) and in the Dagestani town of Buynaksk. On 4 September 1999, 62 people died in an apartment building housing members of families of Russian soldiers. Over the next two weeks, the bombs targeted three other apartment buildings and a mall; in total over 350 people were killed. The then Prime Minister Putin quickly blamed the attacks on Chechen militants and despite no evidence linking the bombings to Chechens; ordered the bombing campaign of Chechnya.^[56] In February 2000, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated they have not seen any evidence that ties the bombings to Chechnya.^[56] A Russian criminal investigation of the bombings was completed in 2002. The results of the investigation, and the court ruling that followed, concluded that they were organized by Achemez Gochiyaev, who remains at large, and ordered by Khattab and Abu Omar al-Saif (both of whom were later killed), in retaliation for the Russian counteroffensive against their incursion into Dagestan. Six other suspects have been convicted by Russian courts. However, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents were caught by local police for planting one of the bombs, but were later released on orders from Moscow.^[57] Many observers, including State Duma deputies Yuri Shchekochikhin, Sergei Kovalev and Sergei Yushenkov, cast doubts on the official version and sought an independent investigation. Some others, including David Satter, Yury Felshtinsky, Vladimir Pribylovsky and Alexander Litvinenko, as well as the secessionist Chechen authorities, claimed that the 1999 bombings were a false flag attack coordinated by the FSB in order to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya, which boosted the popularity of Prime Minister and former FSB Director Vladimir Putin, brought the pro-war Unity Party to the State Duma in the 1999 parliamentary election, and secured Putin as president within a few months. A description of the bombings as FSB false-flag operations appears in the book Blowing Up Russia, which is banned in the Russian Federation.^{[58][59][60][61][62][63][64]}

1999–2000 Russian offensive[edit]

Air war[edit]

In late August and early September 1999, Russia mounted a massive aerial campaign over Chechnya, with the stated aim of wiping out militants who invaded Dagestan earlier in the same month. On 26 August 1999, Russia acknowledged bombing raids in Chechnya.^[65] The Russian air strikes were reported to have forced at least 100,000 Chechens to flee their homes to safety; the neighbouring region of Ingushetia was reported to have appealed for United Nations aid to deal with tens of thousands of refugees.^[66] On 2 October 1999, Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that 78,000 people had fled the air strikes in Chechnya; most of them went to Ingushetia, where they arrived at a rate of 5,000 to 6,000 a day.

As of 22 September 1999, Deputy Interior Minister Igor Zubov said that Russian troops had surrounded Chechnya and were prepared to retake the region, but the military planners were advising against a ground invasion because of the likelihood of heavy Russian casualties.

Land war[edit]

The Chechen conflict entered a new phase on 1 October 1999, when Russia’s new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared the authority of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and his parliament illegitimate.^{[citation needed]} At this time, Putin announced that Russian troops would initiate a land invasion but progress only as far as the Terek River, which cuts the northern third of Chechnya off from the rest of the republic. Putin’s stated intention was to take control of Chechnya’s northern plain and establish a cordon sanitaire against further Chechen aggression; he later recalled that the cordon alone was «pointless and technically impossible,» apparently because of Chechnya’s rugged terrain. According to Russian accounts, Putin accelerated a plan for a major crackdown against Chechnya that had been drawn up months earlier.^[67]

The Russian army moved with ease in the wide open spaces of northern Chechnya and reached the Terek River on 5 October 1999. On this day, a bus filled with refugees was reportedly hit by a Russian tank shell, killing at least 11 civilians;^[68] two days later, Russian Su-24 fighter bombers dropped cluster bombs on the village of Elistanzhi, killing some 35 people.^[69] On 10 October 1999, Maskhadov outlined a peace plan offering a crackdown on renegade warlords;^[69] the offer was rejected by the Russian side. He also appealed to NATO to help end fighting between his forces and Russian troops, without effect.^[70]

On 12 October 1999, the Russian forces crossed the Terek and began a two-pronged advance on the capital Grozny to the south. Hoping to avoid the significant casualties that plagued the first Chechen War, the Russians advanced slowly and in force, making extensive use of artillery and air power in an attempt to soften Chechen defences. Many thousands of civilians fled the Russian advance, leaving Chechnya for neighbouring Russian republics. Their numbers were later estimated to reach 200,000 to 350,000, out of the approximately 800,000 residents of the Chechen Republic. The Russians appeared to be taking no chances with the Chechen population in its rear areas, setting up «filtration camps» in October in northern Chechnya for detaining suspected members of bandformirovaniya militant formations (literally: «bandit formations»).

On 15 October 1999, Russian forces took control of a strategic ridge within artillery range of the Chechen capital Grozny after mounting an intense tank and artillery barrage against Chechen fighters. In response, President Maskhadov declared a gazavat (holy war) to confront the approaching Russian army. Martial law was declared in Ichkeria and reservists were called, but no martial law or state of emergency had been declared in Chechnya or Russia by the Russian government.^[71] The next day, Russian forces captured the strategic Tersky Heights, within sight of Grozny, dislodging 200 entrenched Chechen fighters. After heavy fighting, Russia seized the Chechen base in the village of Goragorsky, west of the city.^[72]

On 21 October 1999, a Russian Scud short-range ballistic missile strike on the central Grozny marketplace killed more than 140 people, including many women and children, and left hundreds more wounded. A Russian spokesman said the busy market was targeted because it was used by separatists as an arms bazaar.^{[citation needed]} Eight days later, Russian aircraft carried out a rocket attack on a large convoy of refugees heading into Ingushetia, killing at least 25 civilians including Red Cross workers and journalists.^[73] Two days later Russian forces conducted a heavy artillery and rocket attack on Samashki; some claimed that civilians were killed in Samashki in revenge for the heavy casualties suffered there by Russian forces during the first war.^[74]

On 12 November 1999, the Russian flag was raised over Chechnya’s second largest city, Gudermes, when the local Chechen commanders, the Yamadayev brothers, defected to the federal side; the Russians also entered the bombed-out former Cossack village of Assinovskaya. The fighting in and around Kulary continued until January 2000. On 17 November 1999, Russian soldiers dislodged separatists in Bamut, the symbolic separatist stronghold in the first war; dozens of Chechen fighters and many civilians were reported killed, and the village was levelled in the FAE bombing. Two days later, after a failed attempt five days earlier, Russian forces managed to capture the village of Achkhoy-Martan.

On 26 November 1999, Deputy Army Chief of Staff Valery Manilov said that phase two of the Chechnya campaign was just about complete, and a final third phase was about to begin. According to Manilov, the aim of the third phase was to destroy «bandit groups» in the mountains. A few days later Russia’s Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said Russian forces might need up to three more months to complete their military campaign in Chechnya, while some generals said the offensive could be over by New Year’s Day. The next day the Chechens briefly recaptured the town of Novogroznensky.^[75]

On 1 December 1999, after weeks of heavy fighting, Russian forces under Major General Vladimir Shamanov took control of Alkhan-Yurt, a village just south of Grozny. The Chechen and foreign fighters inflicted heavy losses on the Russian forces, reportedly killing more than 70 Russian soldiers before retreating,^[76] suffering heavy losses of their own.^[77] On the same day, Chechen separatist forces began carrying out a series of counter-attacks against federal troops in several villages as well as in the outskirts of Gudermes. Chechen fighters in Argun, a small town five kilometres east of Grozny, put up some of the strongest resistance to federal troops since the start of Moscow’s military offensive.^{[citation needed]} The separatists in the town of Urus-Martan also offered fierce resistance, employing guerilla tactics Russia had been anxious to avoid; by 9 December 1999, Russian forces were still bombarding Urus-Martan, although Chechen commanders said their fighters had already pulled out.^{[citation needed]}

On 4 December 1999, the commander of Russian forces in the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, claimed that Grozny was fully blockaded by Russian troops. The Russian military’s next task was the seizure of the town of Shali, 20 kilometres south-east of the capital, one of the last remaining separatist-held towns apart from Grozny. Russian troops started by capturing two bridges that link Shali to the capital, and by 11 December 1999, Russian troops had encircled Shali and were slowly forcing separatists out. By mid-December the Russian military was concentrating attacks in southern parts of Chechnya and preparing to launch another offensive from Dagestan.

Siege of Grozny[edit]

The Russian assault on Grozny began in early December, accompanied by a struggle for neighbouring settlements. The battle ended when the Russian army seized the city on 2 February 2000. According to official Russian figures, at least 134 federal troops and an unknown number of pro-Russian militiamen died in Grozny. The separatist forces also suffered heavy losses, including losing several top commanders. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said that 1,500 separatists were killed trying to leave Grozny. The separatists said they lost at least 500 fighters in the mine field at Alkhan-Kala.^[78] The siege and fighting devastated the capital like no other European city since World War II. In 2003, the United Nations called Grozny the most destroyed city on Earth.^[79] The Russians also suffered heavy losses as they advanced elsewhere, and from Chechen counterattacks and convoy ambushes. On 26 January 2000, the Russian government announced that 1,173 servicemen had been killed in Chechnya since October,^[80] more than double the 544 killed reported just 19 days earlier.^[81]

Battle for the mountains[edit]

Heavy fighting accompanied by massive shelling and bombing continued through the winter of 2000 in the mountainous south of Chechnya, particularly in the areas around Argun, Vedeno and Shatoy, where fighting involving Russian paratroopers had raged since 1999.

On 9 February 2000, a Russian tactical missile hit a crowd of people who had come to the local administration building in Shali, a town previously declared as one of the «safe areas», to collect their pensions. The attack was a response to a report that a group of fighters had entered the town. The missile is estimated to have killed some 150 civilians, and was followed by an attack by combat helicopters causing further casualties.^[82] Human Rights Watch called on the Russian military to stop using FAE, known in Russia as «vacuum bombs», in Chechnya, concerned about the large number of civilian casualties caused by what it called «widespread and often indiscriminate bombing and shelling by Russian forces».^[83] On 18 February 2000, a Russian army transport helicopter was shot down in the south, killing 15 men aboard, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo announced in a rare admission by Moscow of losses in the war.^[84]

On 29 February 2000, United Army Group commander Gennady Troshev said that «the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya is over. It will take a couple of weeks longer to pick up splinter groups now.» Russia’s Defense Minister, Marshal of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeyev, evaluated the numerical strength of the separatists at between 2,000 and 2,500 men, «scattered all over Chechnya.» On the same day, a Russian VDV paratroop company from Pskov was attacked by Chechen and Arab fighters near the village of Ulus-Kert in Chechnya’s southern lowlands; at least 84 Russian soldiers were killed in the especially heavy fighting.^{[citation needed]} The official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that at least 659 separatists were killed, including 200 from the Middle East, figures which they said were based on radio-intercept data, intelligence reports, eyewitnesses, local residents and captured Chechens.^[85] On 2 March 2000, an OMON unit from Podolsk opened fire on a unit from Sergiyev Posad in Grozny; at least 24 Russian servicemen were killed in the incident.

In March a large group of more than 1,000 Chechen fighters, led by field commander Ruslan Gelayev, pursued since their withdrawal from Grozny, entered the village of Komsomolskoye in the Chechen foothills and held off a full-scale Russian attack on the town for over two weeks;^{[citation needed]} they suffered hundreds of casualties,^{[citation needed]} while the Russians admitted to more than 50 killed. On 29 March 2000, about 23 Russian soldiers were killed in a separatist ambush on an OMON convoy from Perm in Zhani-Vedeno.

On 23 April 2000, a 22-vehicle convoy carrying ammunition and other supplies to an airborne unit was ambushed near Serzhen-Yurt in the Vedeno Gorge by an estimated 80 to 100 «bandits», according to General Troshev. In the ensuing four-hour battle the federal side lost 15 government soldiers, according to the Russian defence minister. General Troshev told the press that the bodies of four separatist fighters were found. The Russian Airborne Troops headquarters later stated that 20 separatists were killed and two taken prisoner.^[86] Soon, the Russian forces seized the last populated centres of the organized resistance. (Another offensive against the remaining mountain strongholds was launched by Russian forces in December 2000.)

Restoration of federal government[edit]

Russian President Vladimir Putin established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000. The following month, Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov interim head of the pro-Moscow government. This development met with early approval in the rest of Russia, but the continued deaths of Russian troops dampened public enthusiasm. On 23 March 2003, a new Chechen constitution was passed in a referendum. The 2003 Constitution granted the Chechen Republic a significant degree of autonomy, but still tied it firmly to Russia and Moscow’s rule, and went into force on 2 April 2003. The referendum was strongly supported by the Russian government but met a harsh critical response from Chechen separatists; many citizens chose to boycott the ballot.^{[citation needed]} Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated by a bomb blast in 2004. Since December 2005, his son Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the pro-Moscow militia known as kadyrovtsy, has been functioning as the Chechnya’s de facto ruler. Kadyrov has become Chechnya’s most powerful leader and, in February 2007, with support from Putin, Ramzan Kadyrov replaced Alu Alkhanov as president.

Insurgency[edit]

Guerrilla war in Chechnya[edit]

Guerrilla phase by year: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009

Although large-scale fighting within Chechnya had ceased, daily attacks continued, particularly in the southern portions of Chechnya and spilling into nearby territories of the Caucasus, especially after the Caucasus Front was established. Typically small separatist units targeted Russian and pro-Russian officials, security forces, and military and police convoys and vehicles. The separatist units employed IEDs and sometimes combined for larger raids. Russian forces retaliated with artillery and air strikes, as well as counter-insurgency operations. Most soldiers in Chechnya were kontraktniki (contract soldiers) as opposed to the earlier conscripts. While Russia continued to maintain a military presence within Chechnya, federal forces played less of a direct role. Pro-Kremlin Chechen forces under the command of the local strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, known as the kadyrovtsy, dominated law enforcement and security operations, with many members (including Kadyrov himself) being former Chechen separatists who had defected since 1999. Since 2004, the Kadyrovtsy were partly incorporated into two Interior Ministry units, North and South (Sever and Yug). Two other units of the Chechen pro-Moscow forces, East and West (Vostok and Zapad), were commanded by Sulim Yamadayev (Vostok) and Said-Magomed Kakiyev (Zapad) and their men.^[87]

On 16 April 2009, the head of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov, announced that Russia had ended its «anti-terror operation» in Chechnya, claiming that stability had been restored to the territory.^[88] «The decision is aimed at creating the conditions for the future normalisation of the situation in the republic, its reconstruction and development of its socio-economic sphere,» Bortnikov stated. While Chechnya had largely stabilised, there were still clashes with militants in the nearby regions of Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Suicide attacks[edit]

Between June 2000 and September 2004, Chechen insurgents added suicide attacks to their tactics. During this period, there were 23 Chechen-related suicide attacks in and outside Chechnya, notably the hostage taking at an elementary school in Beslan, in which at least 334 people died.

Assassinations[edit]

Both sides of the war carried out multiple assassinations. The most prominent of these included the 13 February 2004 killing of exiled former separatist Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar, and the 9 May 2004 killing of pro-Russian Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov during a parade in Grozny.

Caucasus Front[edit]

While anti-Russian local insurgencies in the North Caucasus started even before the war, in May 2005, two months after Maskahdov’s death, Chechen separatists officially announced that they had formed a Caucasus Front within the framework of «reforming the system of military–political power.» Along with the Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush «sectors,» the Stavropol, Kabardin-Balkar, Krasnodar, Karachai-Circassian, Ossetian and Adyghe jamaats were included. This meant that practically all the regions of Russia’s south were involved in the hostilities.

The Chechen separatist movement took on a new role as the official ideological, logistical and, probably, financial hub of the new insurgency in the North Caucasus.^[89] Increasingly frequent clashes between federal forces and local militants continued in Dagestan, while sporadic fighting erupted in the other southern Russia regions, such as Ingushetia, and notably in Nalchik on 13 October 2005.

Human rights and terrorism[edit]

Human rights and war crimes[edit]

The Second Chechen War saw a new wave of war crimes and violation of international humanitarian law. Both sides have been criticised by international organizations of violating the Geneva Conventions. However, a report by Human Rights Watch states that without minimizing the abuses committed by Chechen fighters, the main reason for civilian suffering in the Second Chechen War came as a result of the abuses committed by the Russian forces on the civilian population.^[90] According to Amnesty International, Chechen civilians have been purposely targeted by Russian forces, in apparent disregard of humanitarian law. The situation has been described by Amnesty International as a Russian campaign to punish an entire ethnic group, on the pretext of «fighting crime and terrorism».^[91] Russian forces have throughout the campaign ignored to follow their Geneva convention obligations, and has taken little responsibility of protecting the civilian population.^[90] Amnesty International stated in their 2001 report that Chechen civilians, including medical personnel, have been the target of military attacks by Russian forces, and hundreds of Chechen civilians and prisoners of war are extrajudicially executed.^[92]

According to human rights activists, Russian troops systematically committed the following crimes in Chechnya: the destruction of cities and villages, not justified by military necessity; shelling and bombardment of unprotected settlements; summary extrajudicial executions and killings of civilians; torture, ill-treatment and infringement of human dignity; serious bodily harm intentionally inflicted on persons not directly participating in hostilities; deliberate strikes against the civilian population, civilian and medical vehicles; illegal detentions of the civilian population and enforced disappearances; looting and destruction of civilian and public property; extortion; taking hostages for ransom; corpse trade.^[93][94][95] There were also rapes,^[96][97][98] which, along with women, were also subjected to men.^{[99][100][101][102][103][104]} According to the Minister of Health of Ichkeria, Umar Khanbiev, Russian forces committed organ harvesting and organ trade during the conflict.^[105]

Russian forces have since the beginning of the conflict indiscriminately and disproportionately bombed and shelled civilian objects, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In one such occasion in October 1999, ten powerful hypersonic missiles fell without warning and targeted the city’s only maternity hospital, post office, mosque, and a crowded market.^{[106][107][108][109]} Most of the casualties occurred at the central market, and the attack is estimated to have killed over 100 instantly and injuring up to 400 others. Similar incidents include the Baku–Rostov highway bombing where the Russian Air Force perpetrated repeated rocket attacks on a large convoy of refugees trying to enter Ingushetia through a supposed «safe exit».^[110][111] This was repeated in December 1999 when Russian soldiers opened fire on a refugee convoy marked with white flags.^[112]

The 1999–2000 siege and bombardments of Grozny caused between 5,000^[113] and 8,000^[114] civilians to perish. The Russian army issued an ultimatum during the Grozny-siege urging Chechens to leave the city or be destroyed without mercy.^[115] Around 300 people were killed while trying to escape in October 1999 and subsequently buried in a mass grave.^[116] The bombing of Grozny included banned Buratino thermobaric and fuel-air bombs, igniting the air of civilians hiding in basements.^[117][118] There were also reports of the use of chemical weapons, banned according to Geneva law.^[119] The Russian president Putin vowed that the military would not stop bombing Grozny until Russian troops quote ‘fulfilled their task to the end.’ In 2003, the United Nations called Grozny the most destroyed city on Earth.^[120]

Another occasion of indiscriminate and perhaps deliberate bombardment is the bombing of Katyr-Yurt which occurred on 4–6 February 2000. The village of Katyr Yurt was far from the war’s front line, and jam-packed with refugees. It was untouched on the morning of 4 February when Russian aircraft, helicopters, fuel-air bombs and Grad missiles pulverised the village. After the bombing the Russian army allowed buses in, and allowed a white-flag refugee convoy to leave after which they bombed that as well.^[121] Banned Thermobaric weapons were fired on the village of Katyr-Yurt. Hundreds of civilians died as a result of the Russian bombardment and the following sweep after.^[122][123] Thermobaric weapons have been used by the Russian army on several occasions according to Human Rights Watch.^[124]

During the Alkhan-Yurt massacre where Russian soldiers went on a murdering spree throughout the village and summarily executing, raping, torturing, looting, burning and killing anyone in their way. Nearly all the killings were committed by Russian soldiers who were looting.^[125] Civilian attempts to stop the madness were often met with death.^[126] There has been no serious attempt conducted by the Russian authorities to bring to justice those accountable for the crimes committed at Alkhan-Yurt. Credible testimony suggests that Russian leadership in the region had knowledge of what was happening and simply chose to ignore it.^[125] Russian military leadership dismissed the incident as «fairy tales», claiming that the bodies were planted and the slaughter fabricated in order to damage the reputation of Russian troops.^[127] Russian general Vladimir Shamanov dismissed accountability for the abuses in the village saying «Don’t you dare touch the soldiers and officers of the Russian army. They are doing a sacred thing today-they are defending Russia. And don’t you dare sully the Russian soldier with your dirty hands!»^[125]

In what is regarded as one of gravest war crimes in the war, Russian federal forces went on a village-sweep (zachistka), that involved summary executions of dozens of people, murder, looting, arson and rape of Chechens (including committing other crimes) in what is known as the Novye Aldi massacre.^{[128][129][130]} Russian troops had cluster-bombed the village a day prior before entering the village, telling local residents to come out from their cellars for inspection the next day.^[131] Upon entering the village, Russian soldiers shot their victims in cold blood, with automatic fire at close range. Victims ranged from a one-year-old babies to an 82-year-old woman. Victims were asked for money or jewelry by Russian soldiers, which served as a pretext for their execution if the amount was insufficient. Federal soldiers removed gold teeth from their victims and looted their corpses. Killings were accompanied by arson in an attempt to destroy evidence of summary executions and other civilian killings. There were several cases of rape. In one incident, Russian soldiers gang raped several women before strangling them to death. Pillage on a massive scale took place in the village, with Russian soldiers stripping the houses of civilians in broad daylight. Any attempt to make the Russian authorities take responsibilities for the massacre resulted in indignant denial. Human Rights Watch described the Russian authorities’ response as «typical». A spokesperson from the Russian Ministry of Defence declared that «these assertions are nothing but a concoction not supported by fact or any proof . . . [and] should be seen as a provocation whose goal is to discredit the federal forces’ operation against the terrorists in Chechnya.«^[131][129] An eye-witness also said that investigators from the Federal Security Service told her the massacre was probably committed by Chechen fighters «disguised as federal troops».^[132]

Western European rights groups estimate there have been about 5,000 forced disappearances in Chechnya since 1999.^[133] Dozens of mass graves containing hundreds of corpses have been uncovered since the start of the Chechen conflict. As of June 2008, there were 57 registered locations of mass graves in Chechnya.^[134] According to Amnesty International, thousands may be buried in unmarked graves including the 5,000 civilians who disappeared since the beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999.^[135] In 2008, the largest mass grave found to date was uncovered in Grozny, containing some 800 bodies from the First Chechen War in 1995.^[134] Russia’s general policy to the Chechen mass graves is to not exhume them.^[136]

American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted in her 24 March 2000 speech to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

We cannot ignore the fact that thousands of Chechen civilians have died and more than 200,000 have been driven from their homes. Together with other delegations, we have expressed our alarm at the persistent, credible reports of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya, including extrajudicial killings. There are also reports that Chechen separatists have committed abuses, including the killing of civilians and prisoners…. The war in Chechnya has greatly damaged Russia’s international standing and is isolating Russia from the international community. Russia’s work to repair that damage, both at home and abroad, or its choice to risk further isolating itself, is the most immediate and momentous challenge that Russia faces.^[137]

The Russian government failed to pursue any accountability process for human rights abuses committed during the course of the conflict in Chechnya. Unable to secure justice domestically, hundreds of victims of abuse have filed applications with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In March 2005 the court issued the first rulings on Chechnya, finding the Russian government guilty of violating the right to life and even the prohibition of torture with respect to civilians who had died or forcibly disappeared at the hands of Russia’s federal troops.^[138] Many similar claims were ruled since against Russia.

Terrorist attacks[edit]

Between May 2002 and September 2004, the Chechen and Chechen-led militants, mostly answering to Shamil Basayev, launched a campaign of terrorism directed against civilian targets in Russia. About 200 people were killed in a series of bombings (most of them suicide attacks), most of them in the 2003 Stavropol train bombing (46), the 2004 Moscow metro bombing (40), and the 2004 Russian aircraft bombings (89). Two big kidnaps, the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis and the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004, resulted in the deaths of many civilians. In the Moscow stand-off, FSB Spetsnaz forces stormed the building on the third day using an unknown incapacitating chemical agent that proved to be lethal without sufficient medical care, resulting in deaths of 133 out of 916 hostages. In Beslan, some 20 hostages had been murdered by their captors before the assault, and the ill-prepared assault (started hastily after explosions in the gym that had been rigged with explosives by the terrorists) resulted in 294 more casualties among the 1,128 hostages, as well as many losses among the special forces.

Other issues[edit]

Georgian Pankisi crisis[edit]

Russian officials have accused the bordering republic of Georgia of allowing Chechen separatists to operate on Georgian territory and permitting the flow of militants and materiel across the Georgian border with Russia. In February 2002, the United States began offering assistance to Georgia in combating «criminal elements» as well as alleged Arab mujahideen activity in Pankisi Gorge as part of the War on Terrorism. Without resistance, Georgian troops have detained an Arab man and six criminals, and declared the region under control.^[139] In August 2002, Georgia accused Russia of a series of secret air strikes on purported separatists havens in the Pankisi Gorge in which a Georgian civilian was reported killed.

On 8 October 2001, a UNOMIG helicopter was shot down in Georgia in Kodori Valley gorge near Abkhazia, amid fighting between Chechens and Abkhazians, killing nine including five UN observers.^[140] Georgia denied having troops in the area, and the suspicion fell on the armed group headed by Chechen warlord Ruslan Gelayev, who was speculated to have been hired by the Georgian government to wage proxy war against separatist Abkhazia. On 2 March 2004, following a number of cross-border raids from Georgia into Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, Gelayev was killed in a clash with Russian border guards while trying to get back from Dagestan into Georgia.

Unilateral ceasefire of 2005[edit]

On 2 February 2005, Chechen separatist president Aslan Maskhadov issued a call for a ceasefire lasting until at least 22 February (the day preceding the anniversary of Stalin’s deportation of the Chechen population). The call was issued through a separatist website and addressed to President Putin, described as a gesture of goodwill. On 8 March 2005, Maskhadov was killed in an operation by Russian security forces in the Chechen community of Tolstoy-Yurt, northeast of Grozny.

Shortly following Maskhadov’s death, the Chechen separatist council announced that Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev had assumed the leadership, a move that was quickly endorsed by Shamil Basayev (Basayev himself died in July 2006). On 2 February 2006, Sadulayev made large-scale changes in his government, ordering all its members to move into Chechen territory. Among other things, he removed First Vice-Premier Akhmed Zakayev from his post (although later Zakayev was appointed a Foreign Minister^[141]). Sadulayev was killed in June 2006, after which he was succeeded as the separatist leader by the veteran terrorist commander Doku Umarov.

Amnesties[edit]

As of November 2007, there were at least seven amnesties for separatist militants, as well as federal servicemen who committed crimes, declared in Chechnya by Moscow since the start of the second war. The first one was announced in 1999 when about 400 Chechen switched sides. (However, according to Putin’s advisor and aide Aslambek Aslakhanov most of them were since killed, both by their former comrades and by the Russians, who by then perceived them as a potential «fifth column».^[142]) Some of the other amnesties included one during September 2003 in connection with the adoption of the republic’s new constitution, and then another between mid-2006 and January 2007.^{[citation needed]} In 2007, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights published a report entitled Amnestied People as Targets for Persecution in Chechnya, which documents the fate of several persons who have been amnestied and subsequently abducted, tortured and killed.

Government censorship of the media coverage[edit]

The first war, with its extensive and largely unrestricted coverage (despite deaths of many journalists), convinced the Kremlin more than any other event that it needed to control national television channels, which most Russians rely on for news, to successfully undertake any major national policy. By the time the second war began, federal authorities had designed and introduced a comprehensive system to limit the access of journalists to Chechnya and shape their coverage.^[143]

The Russian government’s control of all Russian television stations and its use of repressive rules, harassment, censorship, intimidation^[144] and attacks on journalists almost completely deprived the Russian public of the independent information on the conflict. Practically all the local Chechen media are under total control of the pro-Moscow government, Russian journalists in Chechnya face intense harassment and obstruction^[145] leading to widespread self-censorship, while foreign journalists and media outlets too are pressured into censoring their reports on the conflict.^[146] In some cases Russian journalists reporting on Chechnya were jailed (Boris Stomakhin) or kidnapped (Andrei Babitsky), and foreign media outlets (American Broadcasting Company) banned from Russia. Russia’s step came in retaliation for ABC’s broadcast of an interview with Shamil Basayev, the Chechen rebel leader who ordered and/or carried out some of the worst terrorist acts in the country’s history, including the school siege in Beslan that left 330 people dead.^[147] The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society was shut down on «extremism and national hatred» charges. According to a 2007 poll only 11 percent of Russians said they were happy with media coverage of Chechnya.^[148]

Effects[edit]

Civilian losses[edit]

In the Second Chechen War, over 60,000 combatants and non-combatants were killed.^[149] Civilian casualty estimates vary widely. According to the pro-Moscow Chechnya government, 160,000 combatants and non-combatants died or have gone missing in the two wars, including 30,000–40,000 Chechens and about 100,000 Russians;^[150][151] while separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov (deceased) repeatedly claimed about 200,000 ethnic Chechens died as a consequence of the two conflicts.^[152] As in the case of military losses, these claims can not be independently verified. According to a count by the Russian human rights group Memorial in 2007, up to 25,000 civilians have died or disappeared since 1999.^[153] According to Amnesty International in 2007, the second war killed up to 25,000 civilians since 1999, with up to another 5,000 people missing.^[23] However, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society set their estimate of the total death toll in two wars at about 150,000 to 200,000 civilians.^[154]

Environmental damage[edit]

Environmental agencies warn that the Russian republic of Chechnya, devastated by war, now faces ecological disaster. A former aide to Boris Yeltsin believes Russian bombing has rendered Chechnya an «environmental wasteland.»^[155] There is a special concern over widespread oil spills and pollution from sewers damaged by war (the water is polluted to a depth of 250 m^[156]), and chemical and radioactive pollution, as a result of the bombardment of chemical facilities and storages during the conflict.^[157] Chechnya’s wildlife also sustained heavy damage during the hostilities, as animals that had once populated the Chechen forests have moved off to seek safer ground.^[158] In 2004, Russian government has designated one-third of Chechnya a «zone of ecological disaster» and another 40% «a zone of extreme environmental distress».^[159]

Land mines[edit]

Chechnya is the most land mine-affected region worldwide.^[160] Since 1994 there have been widespread use of mines, by both sides (Russia is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons but not the 1996 protocol on land mines and other devices). The most heavily mined areas of Chechnya are those in which separatists continue to put up resistance, namely the southern regions, as well as the borders of the republic.^[161] No humanitarian mine clearance has taken place since the HALO Trust was evicted by Russia in December 1999. In June 2002, Olara Otunnu, the UN official, estimated that there were 500,000 land mines placed in the region. UNICEF has recorded 2,340 civilian land mine and unexploded ordnance casualties occurring in Chechnya between 1999 and the end of 2003.

Military losses[edit]

Military casualty figures from both sides are impossible to verify and are generally believed to be higher. In September 2000, the National Endowment for Democracy compiled the list of casualties officially announced in the first year of the conflict, which, although incomplete and with little factual value, provide a minimum insight in the information war. According to the figures released by the Russian Ministry of Defence on in August 2005, at least 1,250 Russian Armed Forces soldiers have been killed in action 1999–2005.^[162] This death toll did not include losses of Internal Troops, the FSB, police and local paramilitaries, of whom all at least 1,720 were killed by October 2003.^[154] The independent Russian and Western estimates are much higher; the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia for instance estimated about 2,000 Russian Army servicemen have been killed between 1999 and 2003.^[153]

Political radicalization of the separatist movement[edit]

The Chechens had become increasingly radicalized. Former Soviet Armed Forces officers Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov have been succeeded by people who rely more on Islamist, rather than the secular nationalistic feelings of the population. While Dudayev and Maskhadov were seeking from Moscow recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, other leaders spoke out more about the need to expel Russia from the territory of the whole North Caucasus, an impoverished mountain region inhabited mostly by Muslim, non-Russian ethnic groups.^{[citation needed]}

In April 2006, asked whether negotiations with Russians are possible, the top separatist commander Doku Umarov answered: «We offered them many times. But it turned out that we constantly press for negotiations and it’s as if we are always standing with an extended hand and this is taken as a sign of our weakness. Therefore we don’t plan to do this any more.» In the same month, the new separatist spokesman Movladi Udugov said that attacks should be expected anywhere in Russia: «Today, we have a different task on our hands – total war, war everywhere our enemy can be reached. (…) And this means mounting attacks at any place, not just in the Caucasus but in all Russia.» Reflecting growing radicalization of the Chechen-led militants, Udugov said their goal was no longer Western-style democracy and independence, but the Islamist «North Caucasian Emirate».^{[citation needed]}

This trend ultimately resulted in the October 2007 declaration of Caucasus Emirate by Doku Umarov where he also urged for a global Jihad, and the political schism between the moderates and the radical Islamists fighting in Chechnya and the neighbouring regions with ties in the Middle East.^[163] Some commanders, still fighting along with Doku Umarov, like Anzor Astemirov, have publicly denounced the idea of a global Jihad, but keep fighting for the independence of Caucasus states.^[164]

The struggle has garnered support from Muslim sympathizers around the world nonetheless, and some of them have been willing to take up arms. Many commentators think it is likely that Chechen fighters have links with international Islamist separatist groups. The BBC said in an online Q&A on the conflict: «It has been known for years that Muslim volunteers have traveled to Chechnya to join the fight, reportedly after attending training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan.»^[153] Projecting back from the post-9/11 period, some have linked Chechen resistance to Russia to the al-Qaida global jihad movement. However, the number of foreign jihad fighters in Chechnya was at most in the hundreds.^[165] Most Western observers prior to 11 September regarded the alleged al-Qaida links claimed by Russian government with skepticism. The Clinton and Bush administrations, as well as other NATO governments, uniformly dismissed Moscow’s rhetoric concerning the existence of Chechens in Afghanistan and Afghans in Chechnya as Soviet-style «agitprop» (agitation-propaganda) until 11 September occurred.^[166]

Islamic radicalisation process has also affected Chechen separatist movement’s support abroad. In 2013, the Tsarnaev brothers launched a suicide attack in Boston in claim of jihad, accusing the United States for killing Muslims of Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, weakened sympathy for Chechen resistance from Russia globally and increased xenophobia against Chechens and Muslims in the United States.^[167] Rampant Islamic terrorism in Europe and the exclusive role of the Chechens on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, most notably Abu Omar al-Shishani, also dragged Chechen separatist movement in jeopardy due to increasing anti-Islamic sentiment on the rise in Europe, even in some of the countries in Europe like Poland, who supported Chechens during and after conflicts with Russia.^{[168][169][170]}

Impact on the Chechen population[edit]

According to a 2006 report by Médecins Sans Frontières, «the majority of Chechens still struggle through lives burdened by fear, uncertainty and poverty.» A survey conducted by MSF in September 2005 showed that 77% of the respondents were suffering from «discernible symptoms of psychological distress».^[171]

As of 2008, the infant mortality rate stood at 17 per 1,000, the highest in Russia;^[172] There are reports of a growing number of genetic disorders in babies and unexplained illnesses among school children.^[157] One child in 10 is born with some kind of anomaly that requires treatment. Some children whose parents can afford it are sent to the neighbouring republic of Dagestan, where treatment is better; Chechnya lacks sufficient medical equipment in most of its medical facilities.^[173] According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), since 1994 to 2008 about 25,000 children in Chechnya have lost one or both parents.^[174] A whole generation of Chechen children is showing symptoms of psychological trauma. In 2006, Chechnya’s pro-Moscow deputy health minister, said the Chechen children had become «living specimens» of what it means to grow up with the constant threat of violence and chronic poverty.^[175] In 2007, the Chechen interior ministry has identified 1,000 street children involved in vagrancy; the number was increasing.^[176][177]

According to official statistics, Chechnya’s unemployment rate in August 2009 was 32.9%. By 2017, this figure had decreased to 13.9%.^[178][179] Many people remain homeless because so much of Chechnya’s housing was destroyed by the Russian federal forces and many people have not yet been given compensation.^[180] Not only the social (such as housing and hospitals) and economic infrastructure but also the foundations of culture and education, including most of educational and cultural institutions, were destroyed over the course of the two wars in Chechnya.^[181] However ongoing reconstruction efforts have been rebuilding the region at a quick pace over the past few years, including new housing, facilities, paved roads and traffic lights, a new mosque, and restoration of electricity to much of the region.^[182] Governmental, social and commercial life remain hobbled by bribery, kidnapping, extortion and other criminal activity; reports by the Russian government estimate that the organized crime sector is twice the Russian average and the government is widely perceived to be corrupt and unresponsive.^[183]

Hundreds of thousands of Chechens were displaced by the conflict, including 300,000 at the height of the conflict in 2000.^[153] Most of them were displaced internally in Chechnya and in neighbouring republic of Ingushetia, but thousands of refugees also went into exile, with, as of 2008, most of them residing in the European Union countries.

Impact on the Russian population[edit]

The start of the war bolstered the domestic popularity of Vladimir Putin as the campaign was started one month after he had become Russian prime minister.^[148] The conflict greatly contributed to the deep changes in the Russian politics and society.^[184]

Since the Chechen conflict began in 1994, cases of young veterans returning embittered and traumatized to their home towns have been reported all across Russia. Psychiatrists, law-enforcement officials, and journalists have started calling the condition of psychologically scarred soldiers «Chechen syndrome» (CS), drawing a parallel with the post-traumatic stress disorders suffered by Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan. According to Yuri Alexandrovsky, deputy director of the Moscow Serbsky Institute in 2003, at least 70% of the estimated 1.5 million Chechnya veterans suffered CS.^[185] Many of the veterans came back alcoholic, unemployable and antisocial.^[184] Thousands were also physically disabled for life and left with very limited help from the government.^[186]

According to the 2007 study by Memorial and Demos human rights organisations, Russian policemen lose their qualifications and professional skills during their duty tours in Chechnya.^[187] This conflict was linked to the rising brutality and general criminalisation of the Russian police forces. According to human rights activists and journalists, tens of thousands of police and security forces that have been to Chechnya learned patterns of brutality and impunity and brought them to their home regions, often returning with disciplinary and psychological problems. Reliable numbers on police brutality are hard to come by, but in a statement released in 2006, the internal affairs department of Russia’s Interior Ministry said that the number of recorded crimes committed by police officers rose 46.8% in 2005. In one nationwide poll in 2005, 71% of respondents said they didn’t trust their police at all; in another, 41% Russians said they lived in fear of police violence.^[188][189] According to Amnesty International, torture of detainees in Russia is now endemic.^[184] Since 2007, police officers from outside Caucasus are now not only being sent to Chechnya, but to all the region’s republics.^[187]

The wars in Chechnya, and the associated Caucasian terrorism in Russia, were a major factor in the growth of intolerance, xenophobia, and racist violence in Russia, directed in a great part against the people from Caucasus.^[184] The Russian authorities were unlikely to label random attacks on people of non-Russian ethnicity as racist, preferring calling it «hooliganism».^{[citation needed]} The number of murders officially classified as racist more than doubled in Russia between 2003 and 2004. The violence included acts of terrorism such as the 2006 Moscow market bombing which killed 13 people.^[190][191] In 2007, 18-year-old Artur Ryno claimed responsibility for 37 racially motivated murders in the course of one year, saying that «since school [he] hated people from the Caucasus.»^[192] On 5 June 2007, an anti-Chechen riot involving hundreds of people took place in the town of Stavropol in southern Russia. Rioters demanded the eviction of ethnic Chechens following the murder of two young Russians who locals believed were killed by Chechens. The event revived memories of a recent clash between Chechens and local Russians in Kondopoga over an unpaid bill, when two Russians were killed.^[193] The Caucasians also face ethnic-related violence in the ranks of Russian Army.^[194]

Status[edit]

In 2005, there were about 60,000 Federal troops in Chechnya, but that number has since decreased significantly. Tony Wood, a journalist and author who has written extensively about Chechnya, estimated there were about 8,000 local security forces remaining in the region as of 2007. Independent analysts say there are no more than 2,000 armed terrorists combatants still fighting, while Russia says only a few hundred remain. There is still some sporadic fighting in the mountains and south of the republic, but Russia has scaled down its presence significantly leaving the local government to stabilize things further.^[153] In February 2008 the President of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dokka Umarov, spoke of «thousands of fighters» when he addressed a speech to all his fighters in the mountains.^[195]

Most of the more prominent past Chechen separatist leaders have died or have been killed, including former president Aslan Maskhadov and leading warlord and terrorist attack mastermind Shamil Basayev. Meanwhile, the fortunes of the Chechen independence movement sagged, plagued by the internal disunity between Chechen moderates and Islamist radicals and the changing global political climate after 11 September 2001, as well as the general war-weariness of the Chechen population. Large-scale fighting has been replaced by guerrilla warfare and bombings targeting federal troops and forces of the regional government, with the violence often spilling over into adjacent regions. Since 2005, the insurgency has largely shifted out of Chechnya proper and into the nearby Russian territories, such as Ingushetia and Dagestan; the Russian government, for its part, has focused on the stabilization of the North Caucasus.

Throughout the years Russian officials have often announced that the war is over. In April 2002, President Vladimir Putin’s declared that the war in Chechnya was over.^[196]
The Russian government maintains the conflict officially ended in April 2002,^[196][197] and since then has continued largely as a peacekeeping operation.

In a 10 July 2006, interview with the BBC, Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s then–prime minister and former minister of defense, said that «the war is over,» and that «the military campaign lasted only 2 years.»^[198]

Ramzan Kadyrov, the current president of the Chechnya, has also stated the war is over.^[199] Others believe the war ended in 2003 with the passage of a Moscow-backed constitutional referendum and the election of pro-Moscow president Akhmad Kadyrov, while some consider the conflict on-going.^[200] Some independent observers, including Álvaro Gil-Robles, the human rights envoy for the Council of Europe, and Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have said that the war has largely concluded as of 2006.^[201][202]

The separatists denied that the war was over, and guerrilla warfare continued throughout the North Caucasus. Colonel Sulim Yamadayev, Chechnya’s second most powerful loyalist warlord after Kadyrov, also denied that the war is over. In March 2007, Yamadayev claimed there were well over 1,000 separatists and foreign Islamic militants entrenched in the mountains of Chechnya alone: «The war is not over, the war is far from being over. What we are facing now is basically a classic partisan war and my prognosis is that it will last two, three, maybe even five more years.»^[203] According to the CIA factbook, Russia has severely disabled the Chechen separatist movement, although sporadic violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus.^[204] The overall security situation in Chechnya remains exceedingly difficult to accurately report due to the near monopoly the Russian government has on media covering the issue.^{[citation needed]} In May 2007, Amnesty International refuted claims by the government that the conflict has ended, stating «while large-scale military operations have been reduced, the conflict continues.»^[205] The strength of the separatists has for many years been unknown. Although Russia has killed a lot of separatists throughout the war, many young fighters have joined the separatists.^[206]

An estimation, based on the war reports, shows that in the past three years Federal casualties are higher than the number of coalition casualties of the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021).^{[207][208][209]}
With the abolition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate by the president of the separatist movement Dokka Umarov, the conflict in Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus is often referred to as the «War in the North Caucasus». The Russian government has given no new name to the conflict while most international observers still refer to it as a continuation of the Second Chechen War.^[210]

In late April 2008, the Human Rights Commissioner for the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg, visited Russia’s Caucasian republics. After wrapping up the week-long visit, he said he observed a number of positive developments in Chechnya, and that there was «obvious progress». He also noted that the judicial system in Chechnya was functioning properly. According to Hammarberg, missing people and the identification of missing bodies were still the two biggest human rights issues in the region, and he expressed his wish that further efforts be done to clarify the issue. President Putin responded to his comments, saying that the visit was of «great significance», and that Russia will take into account what the council had to say.^{[211][212][213]}

Counter-insurgency operations have been conducted by Russian army in Chechnya since 1999. President of Chechnya, and former separatist, Ramzan Kadyrov declared this phase to end in March 2009.^[214] On 27 March 2009, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev met with Alexander Bortnikov, the Director of the Federal Security Service to discuss the official ending of counter-terrorism operations in Chechnya. Medvedev directed the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, which Bortnikov also heads, to report to the Russian government on this issue, which will then be decided by the Russian parliament.^[215] However Medvedev asserted that situation in Chechnya must remain under direct control of the FSB.

On 16 April 2009, the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya was officially ended.^[9] As of 2009, close to 480 active insurgents were fighting in the mountains under leadership of field commander Doku Umarov according to official data.^[216] Doku Umarov was killed by poisoning in 2013.^[217] Umarov’s successor Aliaskhab Kebekov was reported killed in 2015. The «Caucasus Emirate» grouping founded by Umarov in 2007 was by 2015 largely absorbed into the ISIS-affiliated Vilayat Kavkaz led by Rustam Asilderov. Asilderov was reported killed in 2016.^[218]

On 18 October 2022, Ukraine’s parliament condemned the «genocide of the Chechen people» during the First and Second Chechen Wars.^[219][220]

See also[edit]

• Guerrilla phase of the Second Chechen War
• International response to the Second Chechen War
• Insurgency in the North Caucasus

Notes[edit]

References[edit]

Publications[edit]

• Coene, Frederik (2009). The Caucasus — An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-20302-3.

Bibliography[edit]

• «Three Worlds Gone Mad» Author: Robert Young Pelton
• A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya Author: Anna Politkovskaya
• A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya Author: David R. Stone (preview available)
• A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya Author: Anna Politkovskaya (preview available)
• Allah’s Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya Author: Sebastian Smith (preview available)
• Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad Author: James Hughes (preview available)
• Chechnya: From Past To Future Author: Richard Sakwa and others (preview available)
• Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society Author: Valery Tishkov (preview available)
• Chechnya: The Case for Independence Author: Tony Wood
• Chechnya: To the Heart of a Conflict Author: Andrew Meier
• Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya Author: Anne Nivat
• Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya Author: Vanora Bennett
• My Jihad Author: Aukai Collins
• One Soldier’s War Author: Arkady Babchenko.
• Open Wound: Chechnya 1994–2003 Author: Stanley Greene
• Putin’s Russia Author: Anna Politkovskaya
• Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994–2000: Lessons from Urban Combat Author: Olga Oliker (preview available)
• Russia’s Islamic Threat Author: Gordon M. Hahn
• Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia Author: Dmitri Trenin, Anatol Lieven (preview available)
• Russia’s Wars with Chechnya 1994–2003 Author: Michael Orr
• Russian Military Reform, 1992–2002 Author: Anne Aldis, Roger N. McDermott
• Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800–2000: A Deadly Embrace Author: Robert Seely (preview available)
• The Angel of Grozny: Orphans of a Forgotten War Author: Asne Seierstad
• The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Author: Matthew Evangelista (preview available)
• The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule Author: Moshe Gammer (preview available)
• The Oath: A Surgeon Under Fire Author: Khassan Baiev
• The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror Author: Paul J. Murphy (preview available)
• «Welcome to Hell»: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion in Chechnya Author: Human Rights Watch (preview available)

External links[edit]

Timelines and chronologies

• BBC Timeline: Chechnya

Summaries

• CHECHNYA: TWO FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS Conflict Studies Research Centre

Human rights issues

• Video: Is it safe in Chechnya? A European human rights body has described the situation in Russia’s Chechen republic as critical (21 April 2008)
• Council of Europe resolutions on ‘The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic’:
  • Resolution 1323 (2003)
  • Resolution 1403 (2004)
• Human Rights Violations in Chechnya Society for the Russian–Chechen Friendship
• The Trauma of ongoing War in Chechnya Doctors Without Borders

Articles

• «The North Caucasus,» Russian Analytical Digest No. 22 (5 June 2007)
• Critical media coverage of Chechnya stifled Archived 8 March 2007 at the Wayback Machine
• Shifting Battlefields of the Chechen War (April 2006)
• The Chechen resistance movement: 2006 in review Jamestown Foundation
• ISN Case Study: The North Caucasus on the Brink (August 2006) Archived 17 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine

This article is about the war during the period of 1999–2000. For the following conflict in North Caucasus, see Insurgency in the North Caucasus.

Second Chechen War
Part of the Chechen–Russian conflict and Post-Soviet conflicts
A BTR-80 armored personnel carrier disabled by militants during the 2000 Zhani-Vedeno ambush
Date Major combat phase: 7 August 1999 – 30 April 2000[8] (8 months and 24 days) Insurgency phase: 1 May 2000 – 16 April 2009[9] (8 years, 11 months and 15 days) Location North Caucasus, mainly Chechnya and Dagestan Spillovers in Georgia Suicide attacks across Russia Result Russian victory Low-level insurgency continued until 2017 Territorial changes Chechnya reincorporated into Russia
Belligerents
Russia Provisional Council (until 2000) Chechen Republic (since 2009)	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1999–2007) Caucasian Front (2005–2007) Caucasus Emirate (2007–2009) Foreign volunteers: Mujahideen[1][2][3][4] Grey Wolves[5][6][7]
Commanders and leaders
Boris Yeltsin[a] Vladimir Putin[b] Vladimir Shamanov Igor Sergeyev Anatoly Kvashnin Viktor Kazantsev Nikolai Patrushev Gennady Troshev German Ugryumov Mikhail Malofeev † Mikhail Rudchenko [ru] † Nikolai Garidov [ru] † Igor Shifrin [ru] † Pavel Varfolomeev [ru] † Gennady Shpigun † Gaidar Gadzhiyev † Akhmad Kadyrov X Ramzan Kadyrov Alu Alkhanov	Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev X Aslan Maskhadov † Abdul Halim Sadulayev † Shamil Basayev † Dokka Umarov Ruslan Gelayev † Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov † Ramzan Akhmadov † Vakha Arsanov † Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev † Akhmed Zakayev Aslanbek Ismailov [ru] † Arbi Barayev † Ibn al-Khattab † Abu al-Walid † Abu Hafs al-Urduni  † Muhannad Abdullah al-Kurdi
Strength
Russian claim: 80,000 (in 1999)[10]	9,000 (in 1999)[11] 7,000 (in 2000)[11] Russian claim: ~22,000[12]
Casualties and losses
Independent estimates: 9,000–11,000 killed (1999-Feb. 2002; Janes)[13] 4,749 killed (Aug. 2002-Aug. 2003; IISS)[14] 14,000 killed (1999-March 2005; Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers)[15] Russian claim: 7,268–7,476 killed[16][17][18][19]	Chechen claim:[c] 3,170+ killed (1999–2004)[20] Russian claim: 16,299 killed (1999–2009)[21][22]
Civilian casualties Estimate total number of casualties: 30,000 civilians dead (25,000 killed and 5,000 disappeared) according to AI[23] ~80,000 killed in Chechnya (GfbV estimate)[24] More in neighbouring regions 40,000–45,000 civilians killed (Kramer)[25] More than 600 killed during attacks in Russia proper. Total killed military/civilian: ~50,000–80,000

The Second Chechen War (Russian: Втора́я чече́нская война́, Chechen: ШолгIа оьрсийн-нохчийн тӀом, lit. ‘Second Russian-Chechen War’^[26]) took place in Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, from August 1999 to April 2009. In August 1999, Islamist fighters from Chechnya infiltrated Russia’s Dagestan region, violating Russia’s borders. During the initial campaign, Russian military and pro-Russian Chechen paramilitary forces faced Chechen separatists in open combat and seized the Chechen capital Grozny after a winter siege that lasted from December 1999 until February 2000. Russia established direct rule over Chechnya in May 2000 although Chechen militant resistance throughout the North Caucasus region continued to inflict heavy Russian casualties and challenge Russian political control over Chechnya for several years. Both sides carried out attacks against civilians. These attacks drew international condemnation.

In mid-2000, the Russian government transferred certain military responsibilities to pro-Russian Chechen forces. The military phase of operations was terminated in April 2002, and the coordination of the field operations was given first to the Federal Security Service and then to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the summer of 2003.

By 2009, Russia had severely disabled the Chechen separatist movement and large-scale fighting ceased. Russian army and Interior Ministry troops ceased patrolling. Grozny underwent reconstruction efforts and much of the city and surrounding areas were rebuilt quickly. Sporadic violence continued in the North Caucasus; occasional bombings and ambushes against federal troops and forces of the regional governments in the area still occur.^[27][28]

In April 2009, the government operation in Chechnya officially ended.^[9] As the bulk of the army was withdrawn, responsibility for dealing with the low-level insurgency was shouldered by the local police force. Three months later, the exiled leader of the separatist government, Akhmed Zakayev, called for a halt to armed resistance against the Chechen police force from August and said he hoped that «starting with this day Chechens will never shoot at each other».^[29] This marked the end of the Chechen conflict. The death toll of the conflict is unknown, although the total loss of human life, including both combatants and non-combatants, is estimated to be over 60,000.

Names[edit]

The Second Chechen War is also known as the Second Chechen Campaign (Russian: Втора́я чече́нская кампа́ния)^[d][30] or the Second Russian Invasion of Chechnya from the rebel Chechen point of view.

Historical basis of the conflict[edit]

Russian Empire[edit]

Chechnya is an area in the Northern Caucasus which has constantly fought against foreign rule, including the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century. The Russian Terek Cossack Host was established in lowland Chechnya in 1577 by free Cossacks who were resettled from the Volga to the Terek River. In 1783, the Russian Empire and the Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, under which Kartli-Kakheti became a Russian protectorate.^[31] To secure communications with Georgia and other regions of the Transcaucasia, the Russian Empire began spreading its influence into the Caucasus region, starting the Caucasus War in 1817. Russian forces first moved into highland Chechnya in 1830, and the conflict in the area lasted until 1859, when a 250,000-strong army under General Aleksandr Baryatinsky broke down the highlanders’ resistance. Frequent uprisings in the Caucasus also occurred during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78.

Soviet Union[edit]

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chechens established a short-lived Caucasian Imamate which included parts of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia; there was also the secular pan-Caucasian Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus.^[32] The Chechen states were opposed^{[citation needed]} by both sides of the Russian Civil War and most of the resistance was crushed by Bolshevik troops by 1922. Then, months before the creation of the Soviet Union, the Chechen Autonomous Oblast of the Russian SFSR was established. It annexed a part of territory of the former Terek Cossack Host. Chechnya and neighboring Ingushetia formed the Checheno–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936. In 1941, during World War II, a Chechen revolt broke out, led by Hasan Israilov. In 1944, Chechens were deported to the Kazakh SSR and Kirghiz SSR in an act of ethnic cleansing; this was done under the false pretext of Chechen mass collaboration with Nazi Germany. An estimated 1/4 to 1/3 of the Chechen population perished due the harsh conditions.^[33][34][35] Many scholars recognize the deportation as an act of genocide, as did the European Parliament in 2004.^[36][37][38] In 1992 the separatist government built a memorial dedicated to the victims of the acts of 1944. The pro-Russian government would later demolish this memorial.^[39][40] Tombstones which were an integral part of the memorial were found planted on the Akhmad Kadyrov Square next to granite steles honoring the losses of the local pro-Russian power.^[41]

First Chechen War[edit]

During the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya declared independence. In 1992, Chechen and Ingush leaders signed an agreement splitting the joint Checheno–Ingush republic in two, with Ingushetia joining the Russian Federation and Chechnya remaining independent. The tension between Chechnya and Russia over independence ultimately led to Russian intervention in the republic, in which the Russians covertly tried to oust the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. The First Chechen War began in 1994, when Russian forces entered Chechnya on the premise of restoring constitutional order. Following nearly two years of brutal fighting, with a death toll exceeding 100,000 by some estimates, the 1996 Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement was signed and Russian troops were withdrawn from the republic.^[42]

Prelude to the Second Chechen War[edit]

Chaos in Chechnya[edit]

Following the first war, the government’s grip on Chechnya was weak, especially outside the ruined capital Grozny. The areas controlled by separatist groups grew larger and the country became increasingly lawless.^{[citation needed]} The war ravages and lack of economic opportunities left large numbers of heavily armed and brutalized former separatist fighters unemployed. The authority of the government in Grozny was opposed by extremist warlords like Arbi Barayev, who according to some sources was in cooperation with the FSB.^[43] Chechen warlords had been steadily increasing abductions and raids into other parts of the Northern Caucasus.^[44] In place of the devastated economic structure, kidnapping emerged as the principal source of income countrywide, procuring over $200 million during the three-year independence of Chechnya.^[45] It has been estimated that up to 1,300 people were kidnapped in Chechnya between 1996 and 1999,^{[citation needed]} and in 1998, a group of four Western hostages was murdered. In 1998, a state of emergency was declared by the authorities in Grozny. Tensions led to open clashes like the July 1998 confrontation in Gudermes, in which some 50 people died in fighting between Chechen National Guard troops and the Islamist militias.

Russian–Chechen relations (1996–1999)[edit]

Political tensions were fueled in part by allegedly Chechen or pro-Chechen terrorist and criminal activity in Russia, as well as by border clashes. On 16 November 1996, in Kaspiysk (Dagestan), a bomb destroyed an apartment building housing Russian border guards, killing 68 people. The cause of the blast was never determined, but many in Russia blamed Chechen separatists.^[46] Three people died on 23 April 1997, when a bomb exploded in the Russian railway station of Armavir (Krasnodar Krai), and two on 28 May 1997, when another bomb exploded in the Russian railway station of Pyatigorsk (Stavropol Krai). On 22 December 1997, forces of Dagestani militants and Chechnya-based Arab warlord Ibn al-Khattab raided the base of the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army in Buynaksk, Dagestan, inflicting heavy casualties.^[47]

The 1997 election brought to power the separatist president Aslan Maskhadov. In 1998 and 1999, President Maskhadov survived several assassination attempts,^[48] blamed on the Russian intelligence services. In March 1999, General Gennady Shpigun, the Kremlin’s envoy to Chechnya, was kidnapped at the airport in Grozny and ultimately found dead in 2000 during the war. On 7 March 1999, in response to the abduction of General Shpigun, Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin called for an invasion of Chechnya. However, Stepashin’s plan was overridden by the prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov.^[49] Stepashin later said:^[50]

The decision to invade Chechnya was made in March 1999… I was prepared for an active intervention. We were planning to be on the north side of the Terek River by August–September [of 1999] This [the war] would happen regardless to the bombings in Moscow… Putin did not discover anything new. You can ask him about this. He was the director of FSB at this time and had all the information.^[51][52]

According to Robert Bruce Ware, these plans should be regarded as contingency plans. However, Stepashin did actively call for a military campaign against Chechen separatists in August 1999 when he was the prime minister of Russia. But shortly after his televised interview where he talked about plans to restore constitutional order in Chechnya, he was replaced in the PM’s position by Vladimir Putin.^[53]

In late May 1999, Russia announced that it was closing the Russian-Chechnya border in an attempt to combat attacks and criminal activity; border guards were ordered to shoot suspects on sight. On 18 June 1999, seven servicemen were killed when Russian border guard posts were attacked in Dagestan. On 29 July 1999, the Russian Interior Ministry troops destroyed a Chechen border post and captured an 800-meter section of strategic road. On 22 August 1999, 10 Russian policemen were killed by an anti-tank mine blast in North Ossetia, and, on 9 August 1999, six servicemen were kidnapped in the Ossetian capital Vladikavkaz.

Invasion of Dagestan[edit]

The Invasion of Dagestan was the trigger for the Second Chechen War. On 7 August 1999, Shamil Basayev (in association with the Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab, Commander of the Mujahedeen) led two armies of up to 2,000 Chechen, Dagestani, Arab and international mujahideen and Wahhabist militants from Chechnya into the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. This war saw the first (unconfirmed) use of aerial-delivered fuel air explosives (FAE) in mountainous areas, notably in the village of Tando.^[54] By mid-September 1999, the militants were routed from the villages they had captured and pushed back into Chechnya. At least several hundred militants were killed in the fighting; the Federal side reported 275 servicemen killed and approximately 900 wounded.^[55]

Bombings in Russia[edit]

Before the wake of the Dagestani invasion had settled, a series of bombings took place in Russia (in Moscow and in Volgodonsk) and in the Dagestani town of Buynaksk. On 4 September 1999, 62 people died in an apartment building housing members of families of Russian soldiers. Over the next two weeks, the bombs targeted three other apartment buildings and a mall; in total over 350 people were killed. The then Prime Minister Putin quickly blamed the attacks on Chechen militants and despite no evidence linking the bombings to Chechens; ordered the bombing campaign of Chechnya.^[56] In February 2000, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated they have not seen any evidence that ties the bombings to Chechnya.^[56] A Russian criminal investigation of the bombings was completed in 2002. The results of the investigation, and the court ruling that followed, concluded that they were organized by Achemez Gochiyaev, who remains at large, and ordered by Khattab and Abu Omar al-Saif (both of whom were later killed), in retaliation for the Russian counteroffensive against their incursion into Dagestan. Six other suspects have been convicted by Russian courts. However, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents were caught by local police for planting one of the bombs, but were later released on orders from Moscow.^[57] Many observers, including State Duma deputies Yuri Shchekochikhin, Sergei Kovalev and Sergei Yushenkov, cast doubts on the official version and sought an independent investigation. Some others, including David Satter, Yury Felshtinsky, Vladimir Pribylovsky and Alexander Litvinenko, as well as the secessionist Chechen authorities, claimed that the 1999 bombings were a false flag attack coordinated by the FSB in order to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya, which boosted the popularity of Prime Minister and former FSB Director Vladimir Putin, brought the pro-war Unity Party to the State Duma in the 1999 parliamentary election, and secured Putin as president within a few months. A description of the bombings as FSB false-flag operations appears in the book Blowing Up Russia, which is banned in the Russian Federation.^{[58][59][60][61][62][63][64]}

1999–2000 Russian offensive[edit]

Air war[edit]

In late August and early September 1999, Russia mounted a massive aerial campaign over Chechnya, with the stated aim of wiping out militants who invaded Dagestan earlier in the same month. On 26 August 1999, Russia acknowledged bombing raids in Chechnya.^[65] The Russian air strikes were reported to have forced at least 100,000 Chechens to flee their homes to safety; the neighbouring region of Ingushetia was reported to have appealed for United Nations aid to deal with tens of thousands of refugees.^[66] On 2 October 1999, Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that 78,000 people had fled the air strikes in Chechnya; most of them went to Ingushetia, where they arrived at a rate of 5,000 to 6,000 a day.

As of 22 September 1999, Deputy Interior Minister Igor Zubov said that Russian troops had surrounded Chechnya and were prepared to retake the region, but the military planners were advising against a ground invasion because of the likelihood of heavy Russian casualties.

Land war[edit]

The Chechen conflict entered a new phase on 1 October 1999, when Russia’s new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared the authority of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and his parliament illegitimate.^{[citation needed]} At this time, Putin announced that Russian troops would initiate a land invasion but progress only as far as the Terek River, which cuts the northern third of Chechnya off from the rest of the republic. Putin’s stated intention was to take control of Chechnya’s northern plain and establish a cordon sanitaire against further Chechen aggression; he later recalled that the cordon alone was «pointless and technically impossible,» apparently because of Chechnya’s rugged terrain. According to Russian accounts, Putin accelerated a plan for a major crackdown against Chechnya that had been drawn up months earlier.^[67]

The Russian army moved with ease in the wide open spaces of northern Chechnya and reached the Terek River on 5 October 1999. On this day, a bus filled with refugees was reportedly hit by a Russian tank shell, killing at least 11 civilians;^[68] two days later, Russian Su-24 fighter bombers dropped cluster bombs on the village of Elistanzhi, killing some 35 people.^[69] On 10 October 1999, Maskhadov outlined a peace plan offering a crackdown on renegade warlords;^[69] the offer was rejected by the Russian side. He also appealed to NATO to help end fighting between his forces and Russian troops, without effect.^[70]

On 12 October 1999, the Russian forces crossed the Terek and began a two-pronged advance on the capital Grozny to the south. Hoping to avoid the significant casualties that plagued the first Chechen War, the Russians advanced slowly and in force, making extensive use of artillery and air power in an attempt to soften Chechen defences. Many thousands of civilians fled the Russian advance, leaving Chechnya for neighbouring Russian republics. Their numbers were later estimated to reach 200,000 to 350,000, out of the approximately 800,000 residents of the Chechen Republic. The Russians appeared to be taking no chances with the Chechen population in its rear areas, setting up «filtration camps» in October in northern Chechnya for detaining suspected members of bandformirovaniya militant formations (literally: «bandit formations»).

On 15 October 1999, Russian forces took control of a strategic ridge within artillery range of the Chechen capital Grozny after mounting an intense tank and artillery barrage against Chechen fighters. In response, President Maskhadov declared a gazavat (holy war) to confront the approaching Russian army. Martial law was declared in Ichkeria and reservists were called, but no martial law or state of emergency had been declared in Chechnya or Russia by the Russian government.^[71] The next day, Russian forces captured the strategic Tersky Heights, within sight of Grozny, dislodging 200 entrenched Chechen fighters. After heavy fighting, Russia seized the Chechen base in the village of Goragorsky, west of the city.^[72]

On 21 October 1999, a Russian Scud short-range ballistic missile strike on the central Grozny marketplace killed more than 140 people, including many women and children, and left hundreds more wounded. A Russian spokesman said the busy market was targeted because it was used by separatists as an arms bazaar.^{[citation needed]} Eight days later, Russian aircraft carried out a rocket attack on a large convoy of refugees heading into Ingushetia, killing at least 25 civilians including Red Cross workers and journalists.^[73] Two days later Russian forces conducted a heavy artillery and rocket attack on Samashki; some claimed that civilians were killed in Samashki in revenge for the heavy casualties suffered there by Russian forces during the first war.^[74]

On 12 November 1999, the Russian flag was raised over Chechnya’s second largest city, Gudermes, when the local Chechen commanders, the Yamadayev brothers, defected to the federal side; the Russians also entered the bombed-out former Cossack village of Assinovskaya. The fighting in and around Kulary continued until January 2000. On 17 November 1999, Russian soldiers dislodged separatists in Bamut, the symbolic separatist stronghold in the first war; dozens of Chechen fighters and many civilians were reported killed, and the village was levelled in the FAE bombing. Two days later, after a failed attempt five days earlier, Russian forces managed to capture the village of Achkhoy-Martan.

On 26 November 1999, Deputy Army Chief of Staff Valery Manilov said that phase two of the Chechnya campaign was just about complete, and a final third phase was about to begin. According to Manilov, the aim of the third phase was to destroy «bandit groups» in the mountains. A few days later Russia’s Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said Russian forces might need up to three more months to complete their military campaign in Chechnya, while some generals said the offensive could be over by New Year’s Day. The next day the Chechens briefly recaptured the town of Novogroznensky.^[75]

On 1 December 1999, after weeks of heavy fighting, Russian forces under Major General Vladimir Shamanov took control of Alkhan-Yurt, a village just south of Grozny. The Chechen and foreign fighters inflicted heavy losses on the Russian forces, reportedly killing more than 70 Russian soldiers before retreating,^[76] suffering heavy losses of their own.^[77] On the same day, Chechen separatist forces began carrying out a series of counter-attacks against federal troops in several villages as well as in the outskirts of Gudermes. Chechen fighters in Argun, a small town five kilometres east of Grozny, put up some of the strongest resistance to federal troops since the start of Moscow’s military offensive.^{[citation needed]} The separatists in the town of Urus-Martan also offered fierce resistance, employing guerilla tactics Russia had been anxious to avoid; by 9 December 1999, Russian forces were still bombarding Urus-Martan, although Chechen commanders said their fighters had already pulled out.^{[citation needed]}

On 4 December 1999, the commander of Russian forces in the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, claimed that Grozny was fully blockaded by Russian troops. The Russian military’s next task was the seizure of the town of Shali, 20 kilometres south-east of the capital, one of the last remaining separatist-held towns apart from Grozny. Russian troops started by capturing two bridges that link Shali to the capital, and by 11 December 1999, Russian troops had encircled Shali and were slowly forcing separatists out. By mid-December the Russian military was concentrating attacks in southern parts of Chechnya and preparing to launch another offensive from Dagestan.

Siege of Grozny[edit]

The Russian assault on Grozny began in early December, accompanied by a struggle for neighbouring settlements. The battle ended when the Russian army seized the city on 2 February 2000. According to official Russian figures, at least 134 federal troops and an unknown number of pro-Russian militiamen died in Grozny. The separatist forces also suffered heavy losses, including losing several top commanders. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said that 1,500 separatists were killed trying to leave Grozny. The separatists said they lost at least 500 fighters in the mine field at Alkhan-Kala.^[78] The siege and fighting devastated the capital like no other European city since World War II. In 2003, the United Nations called Grozny the most destroyed city on Earth.^[79] The Russians also suffered heavy losses as they advanced elsewhere, and from Chechen counterattacks and convoy ambushes. On 26 January 2000, the Russian government announced that 1,173 servicemen had been killed in Chechnya since October,^[80] more than double the 544 killed reported just 19 days earlier.^[81]

Battle for the mountains[edit]

Heavy fighting accompanied by massive shelling and bombing continued through the winter of 2000 in the mountainous south of Chechnya, particularly in the areas around Argun, Vedeno and Shatoy, where fighting involving Russian paratroopers had raged since 1999.

On 9 February 2000, a Russian tactical missile hit a crowd of people who had come to the local administration building in Shali, a town previously declared as one of the «safe areas», to collect their pensions. The attack was a response to a report that a group of fighters had entered the town. The missile is estimated to have killed some 150 civilians, and was followed by an attack by combat helicopters causing further casualties.^[82] Human Rights Watch called on the Russian military to stop using FAE, known in Russia as «vacuum bombs», in Chechnya, concerned about the large number of civilian casualties caused by what it called «widespread and often indiscriminate bombing and shelling by Russian forces».^[83] On 18 February 2000, a Russian army transport helicopter was shot down in the south, killing 15 men aboard, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo announced in a rare admission by Moscow of losses in the war.^[84]

On 29 February 2000, United Army Group commander Gennady Troshev said that «the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya is over. It will take a couple of weeks longer to pick up splinter groups now.» Russia’s Defense Minister, Marshal of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeyev, evaluated the numerical strength of the separatists at between 2,000 and 2,500 men, «scattered all over Chechnya.» On the same day, a Russian VDV paratroop company from Pskov was attacked by Chechen and Arab fighters near the village of Ulus-Kert in Chechnya’s southern lowlands; at least 84 Russian soldiers were killed in the especially heavy fighting.^{[citation needed]} The official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that at least 659 separatists were killed, including 200 from the Middle East, figures which they said were based on radio-intercept data, intelligence reports, eyewitnesses, local residents and captured Chechens.^[85] On 2 March 2000, an OMON unit from Podolsk opened fire on a unit from Sergiyev Posad in Grozny; at least 24 Russian servicemen were killed in the incident.

In March a large group of more than 1,000 Chechen fighters, led by field commander Ruslan Gelayev, pursued since their withdrawal from Grozny, entered the village of Komsomolskoye in the Chechen foothills and held off a full-scale Russian attack on the town for over two weeks;^{[citation needed]} they suffered hundreds of casualties,^{[citation needed]} while the Russians admitted to more than 50 killed. On 29 March 2000, about 23 Russian soldiers were killed in a separatist ambush on an OMON convoy from Perm in Zhani-Vedeno.

On 23 April 2000, a 22-vehicle convoy carrying ammunition and other supplies to an airborne unit was ambushed near Serzhen-Yurt in the Vedeno Gorge by an estimated 80 to 100 «bandits», according to General Troshev. In the ensuing four-hour battle the federal side lost 15 government soldiers, according to the Russian defence minister. General Troshev told the press that the bodies of four separatist fighters were found. The Russian Airborne Troops headquarters later stated that 20 separatists were killed and two taken prisoner.^[86] Soon, the Russian forces seized the last populated centres of the organized resistance. (Another offensive against the remaining mountain strongholds was launched by Russian forces in December 2000.)

Restoration of federal government[edit]

Russian President Vladimir Putin established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000. The following month, Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov interim head of the pro-Moscow government. This development met with early approval in the rest of Russia, but the continued deaths of Russian troops dampened public enthusiasm. On 23 March 2003, a new Chechen constitution was passed in a referendum. The 2003 Constitution granted the Chechen Republic a significant degree of autonomy, but still tied it firmly to Russia and Moscow’s rule, and went into force on 2 April 2003. The referendum was strongly supported by the Russian government but met a harsh critical response from Chechen separatists; many citizens chose to boycott the ballot.^{[citation needed]} Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated by a bomb blast in 2004. Since December 2005, his son Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the pro-Moscow militia known as kadyrovtsy, has been functioning as the Chechnya’s de facto ruler. Kadyrov has become Chechnya’s most powerful leader and, in February 2007, with support from Putin, Ramzan Kadyrov replaced Alu Alkhanov as president.

Insurgency[edit]

Guerrilla war in Chechnya[edit]

Guerrilla phase by year: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009

Although large-scale fighting within Chechnya had ceased, daily attacks continued, particularly in the southern portions of Chechnya and spilling into nearby territories of the Caucasus, especially after the Caucasus Front was established. Typically small separatist units targeted Russian and pro-Russian officials, security forces, and military and police convoys and vehicles. The separatist units employed IEDs and sometimes combined for larger raids. Russian forces retaliated with artillery and air strikes, as well as counter-insurgency operations. Most soldiers in Chechnya were kontraktniki (contract soldiers) as opposed to the earlier conscripts. While Russia continued to maintain a military presence within Chechnya, federal forces played less of a direct role. Pro-Kremlin Chechen forces under the command of the local strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, known as the kadyrovtsy, dominated law enforcement and security operations, with many members (including Kadyrov himself) being former Chechen separatists who had defected since 1999. Since 2004, the Kadyrovtsy were partly incorporated into two Interior Ministry units, North and South (Sever and Yug). Two other units of the Chechen pro-Moscow forces, East and West (Vostok and Zapad), were commanded by Sulim Yamadayev (Vostok) and Said-Magomed Kakiyev (Zapad) and their men.^[87]

On 16 April 2009, the head of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov, announced that Russia had ended its «anti-terror operation» in Chechnya, claiming that stability had been restored to the territory.^[88] «The decision is aimed at creating the conditions for the future normalisation of the situation in the republic, its reconstruction and development of its socio-economic sphere,» Bortnikov stated. While Chechnya had largely stabilised, there were still clashes with militants in the nearby regions of Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Suicide attacks[edit]

Between June 2000 and September 2004, Chechen insurgents added suicide attacks to their tactics. During this period, there were 23 Chechen-related suicide attacks in and outside Chechnya, notably the hostage taking at an elementary school in Beslan, in which at least 334 people died.

Assassinations[edit]

Both sides of the war carried out multiple assassinations. The most prominent of these included the 13 February 2004 killing of exiled former separatist Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar, and the 9 May 2004 killing of pro-Russian Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov during a parade in Grozny.

Caucasus Front[edit]

While anti-Russian local insurgencies in the North Caucasus started even before the war, in May 2005, two months after Maskahdov’s death, Chechen separatists officially announced that they had formed a Caucasus Front within the framework of «reforming the system of military–political power.» Along with the Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush «sectors,» the Stavropol, Kabardin-Balkar, Krasnodar, Karachai-Circassian, Ossetian and Adyghe jamaats were included. This meant that practically all the regions of Russia’s south were involved in the hostilities.

The Chechen separatist movement took on a new role as the official ideological, logistical and, probably, financial hub of the new insurgency in the North Caucasus.^[89] Increasingly frequent clashes between federal forces and local militants continued in Dagestan, while sporadic fighting erupted in the other southern Russia regions, such as Ingushetia, and notably in Nalchik on 13 October 2005.

Human rights and terrorism[edit]

Human rights and war crimes[edit]

The Second Chechen War saw a new wave of war crimes and violation of international humanitarian law. Both sides have been criticised by international organizations of violating the Geneva Conventions. However, a report by Human Rights Watch states that without minimizing the abuses committed by Chechen fighters, the main reason for civilian suffering in the Second Chechen War came as a result of the abuses committed by the Russian forces on the civilian population.^[90] According to Amnesty International, Chechen civilians have been purposely targeted by Russian forces, in apparent disregard of humanitarian law. The situation has been described by Amnesty International as a Russian campaign to punish an entire ethnic group, on the pretext of «fighting crime and terrorism».^[91] Russian forces have throughout the campaign ignored to follow their Geneva convention obligations, and has taken little responsibility of protecting the civilian population.^[90] Amnesty International stated in their 2001 report that Chechen civilians, including medical personnel, have been the target of military attacks by Russian forces, and hundreds of Chechen civilians and prisoners of war are extrajudicially executed.^[92]

According to human rights activists, Russian troops systematically committed the following crimes in Chechnya: the destruction of cities and villages, not justified by military necessity; shelling and bombardment of unprotected settlements; summary extrajudicial executions and killings of civilians; torture, ill-treatment and infringement of human dignity; serious bodily harm intentionally inflicted on persons not directly participating in hostilities; deliberate strikes against the civilian population, civilian and medical vehicles; illegal detentions of the civilian population and enforced disappearances; looting and destruction of civilian and public property; extortion; taking hostages for ransom; corpse trade.^[93][94][95] There were also rapes,^[96][97][98] which, along with women, were also subjected to men.^{[99][100][101][102][103][104]} According to the Minister of Health of Ichkeria, Umar Khanbiev, Russian forces committed organ harvesting and organ trade during the conflict.^[105]

Russian forces have since the beginning of the conflict indiscriminately and disproportionately bombed and shelled civilian objects, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In one such occasion in October 1999, ten powerful hypersonic missiles fell without warning and targeted the city’s only maternity hospital, post office, mosque, and a crowded market.^{[106][107][108][109]} Most of the casualties occurred at the central market, and the attack is estimated to have killed over 100 instantly and injuring up to 400 others. Similar incidents include the Baku–Rostov highway bombing where the Russian Air Force perpetrated repeated rocket attacks on a large convoy of refugees trying to enter Ingushetia through a supposed «safe exit».^[110][111] This was repeated in December 1999 when Russian soldiers opened fire on a refugee convoy marked with white flags.^[112]

The 1999–2000 siege and bombardments of Grozny caused between 5,000^[113] and 8,000^[114] civilians to perish. The Russian army issued an ultimatum during the Grozny-siege urging Chechens to leave the city or be destroyed without mercy.^[115] Around 300 people were killed while trying to escape in October 1999 and subsequently buried in a mass grave.^[116] The bombing of Grozny included banned Buratino thermobaric and fuel-air bombs, igniting the air of civilians hiding in basements.^[117][118] There were also reports of the use of chemical weapons, banned according to Geneva law.^[119] The Russian president Putin vowed that the military would not stop bombing Grozny until Russian troops quote ‘fulfilled their task to the end.’ In 2003, the United Nations called Grozny the most destroyed city on Earth.^[120]

Another occasion of indiscriminate and perhaps deliberate bombardment is the bombing of Katyr-Yurt which occurred on 4–6 February 2000. The village of Katyr Yurt was far from the war’s front line, and jam-packed with refugees. It was untouched on the morning of 4 February when Russian aircraft, helicopters, fuel-air bombs and Grad missiles pulverised the village. After the bombing the Russian army allowed buses in, and allowed a white-flag refugee convoy to leave after which they bombed that as well.^[121] Banned Thermobaric weapons were fired on the village of Katyr-Yurt. Hundreds of civilians died as a result of the Russian bombardment and the following sweep after.^[122][123] Thermobaric weapons have been used by the Russian army on several occasions according to Human Rights Watch.^[124]

During the Alkhan-Yurt massacre where Russian soldiers went on a murdering spree throughout the village and summarily executing, raping, torturing, looting, burning and killing anyone in their way. Nearly all the killings were committed by Russian soldiers who were looting.^[125] Civilian attempts to stop the madness were often met with death.^[126] There has been no serious attempt conducted by the Russian authorities to bring to justice those accountable for the crimes committed at Alkhan-Yurt. Credible testimony suggests that Russian leadership in the region had knowledge of what was happening and simply chose to ignore it.^[125] Russian military leadership dismissed the incident as «fairy tales», claiming that the bodies were planted and the slaughter fabricated in order to damage the reputation of Russian troops.^[127] Russian general Vladimir Shamanov dismissed accountability for the abuses in the village saying «Don’t you dare touch the soldiers and officers of the Russian army. They are doing a sacred thing today-they are defending Russia. And don’t you dare sully the Russian soldier with your dirty hands!»^[125]

In what is regarded as one of gravest war crimes in the war, Russian federal forces went on a village-sweep (zachistka), that involved summary executions of dozens of people, murder, looting, arson and rape of Chechens (including committing other crimes) in what is known as the Novye Aldi massacre.^{[128][129][130]} Russian troops had cluster-bombed the village a day prior before entering the village, telling local residents to come out from their cellars for inspection the next day.^[131] Upon entering the village, Russian soldiers shot their victims in cold blood, with automatic fire at close range. Victims ranged from a one-year-old babies to an 82-year-old woman. Victims were asked for money or jewelry by Russian soldiers, which served as a pretext for their execution if the amount was insufficient. Federal soldiers removed gold teeth from their victims and looted their corpses. Killings were accompanied by arson in an attempt to destroy evidence of summary executions and other civilian killings. There were several cases of rape. In one incident, Russian soldiers gang raped several women before strangling them to death. Pillage on a massive scale took place in the village, with Russian soldiers stripping the houses of civilians in broad daylight. Any attempt to make the Russian authorities take responsibilities for the massacre resulted in indignant denial. Human Rights Watch described the Russian authorities’ response as «typical». A spokesperson from the Russian Ministry of Defence declared that «these assertions are nothing but a concoction not supported by fact or any proof . . . [and] should be seen as a provocation whose goal is to discredit the federal forces’ operation against the terrorists in Chechnya.«^[131][129] An eye-witness also said that investigators from the Federal Security Service told her the massacre was probably committed by Chechen fighters «disguised as federal troops».^[132]

Western European rights groups estimate there have been about 5,000 forced disappearances in Chechnya since 1999.^[133] Dozens of mass graves containing hundreds of corpses have been uncovered since the start of the Chechen conflict. As of June 2008, there were 57 registered locations of mass graves in Chechnya.^[134] According to Amnesty International, thousands may be buried in unmarked graves including the 5,000 civilians who disappeared since the beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999.^[135] In 2008, the largest mass grave found to date was uncovered in Grozny, containing some 800 bodies from the First Chechen War in 1995.^[134] Russia’s general policy to the Chechen mass graves is to not exhume them.^[136]

American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted in her 24 March 2000 speech to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

We cannot ignore the fact that thousands of Chechen civilians have died and more than 200,000 have been driven from their homes. Together with other delegations, we have expressed our alarm at the persistent, credible reports of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya, including extrajudicial killings. There are also reports that Chechen separatists have committed abuses, including the killing of civilians and prisoners…. The war in Chechnya has greatly damaged Russia’s international standing and is isolating Russia from the international community. Russia’s work to repair that damage, both at home and abroad, or its choice to risk further isolating itself, is the most immediate and momentous challenge that Russia faces.^[137]

The Russian government failed to pursue any accountability process for human rights abuses committed during the course of the conflict in Chechnya. Unable to secure justice domestically, hundreds of victims of abuse have filed applications with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In March 2005 the court issued the first rulings on Chechnya, finding the Russian government guilty of violating the right to life and even the prohibition of torture with respect to civilians who had died or forcibly disappeared at the hands of Russia’s federal troops.^[138] Many similar claims were ruled since against Russia.

Terrorist attacks[edit]

Between May 2002 and September 2004, the Chechen and Chechen-led militants, mostly answering to Shamil Basayev, launched a campaign of terrorism directed against civilian targets in Russia. About 200 people were killed in a series of bombings (most of them suicide attacks), most of them in the 2003 Stavropol train bombing (46), the 2004 Moscow metro bombing (40), and the 2004 Russian aircraft bombings (89). Two big kidnaps, the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis and the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004, resulted in the deaths of many civilians. In the Moscow stand-off, FSB Spetsnaz forces stormed the building on the third day using an unknown incapacitating chemical agent that proved to be lethal without sufficient medical care, resulting in deaths of 133 out of 916 hostages. In Beslan, some 20 hostages had been murdered by their captors before the assault, and the ill-prepared assault (started hastily after explosions in the gym that had been rigged with explosives by the terrorists) resulted in 294 more casualties among the 1,128 hostages, as well as many losses among the special forces.

Other issues[edit]

Georgian Pankisi crisis[edit]

Russian officials have accused the bordering republic of Georgia of allowing Chechen separatists to operate on Georgian territory and permitting the flow of militants and materiel across the Georgian border with Russia. In February 2002, the United States began offering assistance to Georgia in combating «criminal elements» as well as alleged Arab mujahideen activity in Pankisi Gorge as part of the War on Terrorism. Without resistance, Georgian troops have detained an Arab man and six criminals, and declared the region under control.^[139] In August 2002, Georgia accused Russia of a series of secret air strikes on purported separatists havens in the Pankisi Gorge in which a Georgian civilian was reported killed.

On 8 October 2001, a UNOMIG helicopter was shot down in Georgia in Kodori Valley gorge near Abkhazia, amid fighting between Chechens and Abkhazians, killing nine including five UN observers.^[140] Georgia denied having troops in the area, and the suspicion fell on the armed group headed by Chechen warlord Ruslan Gelayev, who was speculated to have been hired by the Georgian government to wage proxy war against separatist Abkhazia. On 2 March 2004, following a number of cross-border raids from Georgia into Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, Gelayev was killed in a clash with Russian border guards while trying to get back from Dagestan into Georgia.

Unilateral ceasefire of 2005[edit]

On 2 February 2005, Chechen separatist president Aslan Maskhadov issued a call for a ceasefire lasting until at least 22 February (the day preceding the anniversary of Stalin’s deportation of the Chechen population). The call was issued through a separatist website and addressed to President Putin, described as a gesture of goodwill. On 8 March 2005, Maskhadov was killed in an operation by Russian security forces in the Chechen community of Tolstoy-Yurt, northeast of Grozny.

Shortly following Maskhadov’s death, the Chechen separatist council announced that Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev had assumed the leadership, a move that was quickly endorsed by Shamil Basayev (Basayev himself died in July 2006). On 2 February 2006, Sadulayev made large-scale changes in his government, ordering all its members to move into Chechen territory. Among other things, he removed First Vice-Premier Akhmed Zakayev from his post (although later Zakayev was appointed a Foreign Minister^[141]). Sadulayev was killed in June 2006, after which he was succeeded as the separatist leader by the veteran terrorist commander Doku Umarov.

Amnesties[edit]

As of November 2007, there were at least seven amnesties for separatist militants, as well as federal servicemen who committed crimes, declared in Chechnya by Moscow since the start of the second war. The first one was announced in 1999 when about 400 Chechen switched sides. (However, according to Putin’s advisor and aide Aslambek Aslakhanov most of them were since killed, both by their former comrades and by the Russians, who by then perceived them as a potential «fifth column».^[142]) Some of the other amnesties included one during September 2003 in connection with the adoption of the republic’s new constitution, and then another between mid-2006 and January 2007.^{[citation needed]} In 2007, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights published a report entitled Amnestied People as Targets for Persecution in Chechnya, which documents the fate of several persons who have been amnestied and subsequently abducted, tortured and killed.

Government censorship of the media coverage[edit]

The first war, with its extensive and largely unrestricted coverage (despite deaths of many journalists), convinced the Kremlin more than any other event that it needed to control national television channels, which most Russians rely on for news, to successfully undertake any major national policy. By the time the second war began, federal authorities had designed and introduced a comprehensive system to limit the access of journalists to Chechnya and shape their coverage.^[143]

The Russian government’s control of all Russian television stations and its use of repressive rules, harassment, censorship, intimidation^[144] and attacks on journalists almost completely deprived the Russian public of the independent information on the conflict. Practically all the local Chechen media are under total control of the pro-Moscow government, Russian journalists in Chechnya face intense harassment and obstruction^[145] leading to widespread self-censorship, while foreign journalists and media outlets too are pressured into censoring their reports on the conflict.^[146] In some cases Russian journalists reporting on Chechnya were jailed (Boris Stomakhin) or kidnapped (Andrei Babitsky), and foreign media outlets (American Broadcasting Company) banned from Russia. Russia’s step came in retaliation for ABC’s broadcast of an interview with Shamil Basayev, the Chechen rebel leader who ordered and/or carried out some of the worst terrorist acts in the country’s history, including the school siege in Beslan that left 330 people dead.^[147] The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society was shut down on «extremism and national hatred» charges. According to a 2007 poll only 11 percent of Russians said they were happy with media coverage of Chechnya.^[148]

Effects[edit]

Civilian losses[edit]

In the Second Chechen War, over 60,000 combatants and non-combatants were killed.^[149] Civilian casualty estimates vary widely. According to the pro-Moscow Chechnya government, 160,000 combatants and non-combatants died or have gone missing in the two wars, including 30,000–40,000 Chechens and about 100,000 Russians;^[150][151] while separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov (deceased) repeatedly claimed about 200,000 ethnic Chechens died as a consequence of the two conflicts.^[152] As in the case of military losses, these claims can not be independently verified. According to a count by the Russian human rights group Memorial in 2007, up to 25,000 civilians have died or disappeared since 1999.^[153] According to Amnesty International in 2007, the second war killed up to 25,000 civilians since 1999, with up to another 5,000 people missing.^[23] However, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society set their estimate of the total death toll in two wars at about 150,000 to 200,000 civilians.^[154]

Environmental damage[edit]

Environmental agencies warn that the Russian republic of Chechnya, devastated by war, now faces ecological disaster. A former aide to Boris Yeltsin believes Russian bombing has rendered Chechnya an «environmental wasteland.»^[155] There is a special concern over widespread oil spills and pollution from sewers damaged by war (the water is polluted to a depth of 250 m^[156]), and chemical and radioactive pollution, as a result of the bombardment of chemical facilities and storages during the conflict.^[157] Chechnya’s wildlife also sustained heavy damage during the hostilities, as animals that had once populated the Chechen forests have moved off to seek safer ground.^[158] In 2004, Russian government has designated one-third of Chechnya a «zone of ecological disaster» and another 40% «a zone of extreme environmental distress».^[159]

Land mines[edit]

Chechnya is the most land mine-affected region worldwide.^[160] Since 1994 there have been widespread use of mines, by both sides (Russia is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons but not the 1996 protocol on land mines and other devices). The most heavily mined areas of Chechnya are those in which separatists continue to put up resistance, namely the southern regions, as well as the borders of the republic.^[161] No humanitarian mine clearance has taken place since the HALO Trust was evicted by Russia in December 1999. In June 2002, Olara Otunnu, the UN official, estimated that there were 500,000 land mines placed in the region. UNICEF has recorded 2,340 civilian land mine and unexploded ordnance casualties occurring in Chechnya between 1999 and the end of 2003.

Military losses[edit]

Military casualty figures from both sides are impossible to verify and are generally believed to be higher. In September 2000, the National Endowment for Democracy compiled the list of casualties officially announced in the first year of the conflict, which, although incomplete and with little factual value, provide a minimum insight in the information war. According to the figures released by the Russian Ministry of Defence on in August 2005, at least 1,250 Russian Armed Forces soldiers have been killed in action 1999–2005.^[162] This death toll did not include losses of Internal Troops, the FSB, police and local paramilitaries, of whom all at least 1,720 were killed by October 2003.^[154] The independent Russian and Western estimates are much higher; the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia for instance estimated about 2,000 Russian Army servicemen have been killed between 1999 and 2003.^[153]

Political radicalization of the separatist movement[edit]

The Chechens had become increasingly radicalized. Former Soviet Armed Forces officers Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov have been succeeded by people who rely more on Islamist, rather than the secular nationalistic feelings of the population. While Dudayev and Maskhadov were seeking from Moscow recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, other leaders spoke out more about the need to expel Russia from the territory of the whole North Caucasus, an impoverished mountain region inhabited mostly by Muslim, non-Russian ethnic groups.^{[citation needed]}

In April 2006, asked whether negotiations with Russians are possible, the top separatist commander Doku Umarov answered: «We offered them many times. But it turned out that we constantly press for negotiations and it’s as if we are always standing with an extended hand and this is taken as a sign of our weakness. Therefore we don’t plan to do this any more.» In the same month, the new separatist spokesman Movladi Udugov said that attacks should be expected anywhere in Russia: «Today, we have a different task on our hands – total war, war everywhere our enemy can be reached. (…) And this means mounting attacks at any place, not just in the Caucasus but in all Russia.» Reflecting growing radicalization of the Chechen-led militants, Udugov said their goal was no longer Western-style democracy and independence, but the Islamist «North Caucasian Emirate».^{[citation needed]}

This trend ultimately resulted in the October 2007 declaration of Caucasus Emirate by Doku Umarov where he also urged for a global Jihad, and the political schism between the moderates and the radical Islamists fighting in Chechnya and the neighbouring regions with ties in the Middle East.^[163] Some commanders, still fighting along with Doku Umarov, like Anzor Astemirov, have publicly denounced the idea of a global Jihad, but keep fighting for the independence of Caucasus states.^[164]

The struggle has garnered support from Muslim sympathizers around the world nonetheless, and some of them have been willing to take up arms. Many commentators think it is likely that Chechen fighters have links with international Islamist separatist groups. The BBC said in an online Q&A on the conflict: «It has been known for years that Muslim volunteers have traveled to Chechnya to join the fight, reportedly after attending training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan.»^[153] Projecting back from the post-9/11 period, some have linked Chechen resistance to Russia to the al-Qaida global jihad movement. However, the number of foreign jihad fighters in Chechnya was at most in the hundreds.^[165] Most Western observers prior to 11 September regarded the alleged al-Qaida links claimed by Russian government with skepticism. The Clinton and Bush administrations, as well as other NATO governments, uniformly dismissed Moscow’s rhetoric concerning the existence of Chechens in Afghanistan and Afghans in Chechnya as Soviet-style «agitprop» (agitation-propaganda) until 11 September occurred.^[166]

Islamic radicalisation process has also affected Chechen separatist movement’s support abroad. In 2013, the Tsarnaev brothers launched a suicide attack in Boston in claim of jihad, accusing the United States for killing Muslims of Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, weakened sympathy for Chechen resistance from Russia globally and increased xenophobia against Chechens and Muslims in the United States.^[167] Rampant Islamic terrorism in Europe and the exclusive role of the Chechens on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, most notably Abu Omar al-Shishani, also dragged Chechen separatist movement in jeopardy due to increasing anti-Islamic sentiment on the rise in Europe, even in some of the countries in Europe like Poland, who supported Chechens during and after conflicts with Russia.^{[168][169][170]}

Impact on the Chechen population[edit]

According to a 2006 report by Médecins Sans Frontières, «the majority of Chechens still struggle through lives burdened by fear, uncertainty and poverty.» A survey conducted by MSF in September 2005 showed that 77% of the respondents were suffering from «discernible symptoms of psychological distress».^[171]

As of 2008, the infant mortality rate stood at 17 per 1,000, the highest in Russia;^[172] There are reports of a growing number of genetic disorders in babies and unexplained illnesses among school children.^[157] One child in 10 is born with some kind of anomaly that requires treatment. Some children whose parents can afford it are sent to the neighbouring republic of Dagestan, where treatment is better; Chechnya lacks sufficient medical equipment in most of its medical facilities.^[173] According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), since 1994 to 2008 about 25,000 children in Chechnya have lost one or both parents.^[174] A whole generation of Chechen children is showing symptoms of psychological trauma. In 2006, Chechnya’s pro-Moscow deputy health minister, said the Chechen children had become «living specimens» of what it means to grow up with the constant threat of violence and chronic poverty.^[175] In 2007, the Chechen interior ministry has identified 1,000 street children involved in vagrancy; the number was increasing.^[176][177]

According to official statistics, Chechnya’s unemployment rate in August 2009 was 32.9%. By 2017, this figure had decreased to 13.9%.^[178][179] Many people remain homeless because so much of Chechnya’s housing was destroyed by the Russian federal forces and many people have not yet been given compensation.^[180] Not only the social (such as housing and hospitals) and economic infrastructure but also the foundations of culture and education, including most of educational and cultural institutions, were destroyed over the course of the two wars in Chechnya.^[181] However ongoing reconstruction efforts have been rebuilding the region at a quick pace over the past few years, including new housing, facilities, paved roads and traffic lights, a new mosque, and restoration of electricity to much of the region.^[182] Governmental, social and commercial life remain hobbled by bribery, kidnapping, extortion and other criminal activity; reports by the Russian government estimate that the organized crime sector is twice the Russian average and the government is widely perceived to be corrupt and unresponsive.^[183]

Hundreds of thousands of Chechens were displaced by the conflict, including 300,000 at the height of the conflict in 2000.^[153] Most of them were displaced internally in Chechnya and in neighbouring republic of Ingushetia, but thousands of refugees also went into exile, with, as of 2008, most of them residing in the European Union countries.

Impact on the Russian population[edit]

The start of the war bolstered the domestic popularity of Vladimir Putin as the campaign was started one month after he had become Russian prime minister.^[148] The conflict greatly contributed to the deep changes in the Russian politics and society.^[184]

Since the Chechen conflict began in 1994, cases of young veterans returning embittered and traumatized to their home towns have been reported all across Russia. Psychiatrists, law-enforcement officials, and journalists have started calling the condition of psychologically scarred soldiers «Chechen syndrome» (CS), drawing a parallel with the post-traumatic stress disorders suffered by Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan. According to Yuri Alexandrovsky, deputy director of the Moscow Serbsky Institute in 2003, at least 70% of the estimated 1.5 million Chechnya veterans suffered CS.^[185] Many of the veterans came back alcoholic, unemployable and antisocial.^[184] Thousands were also physically disabled for life and left with very limited help from the government.^[186]

According to the 2007 study by Memorial and Demos human rights organisations, Russian policemen lose their qualifications and professional skills during their duty tours in Chechnya.^[187] This conflict was linked to the rising brutality and general criminalisation of the Russian police forces. According to human rights activists and journalists, tens of thousands of police and security forces that have been to Chechnya learned patterns of brutality and impunity and brought them to their home regions, often returning with disciplinary and psychological problems. Reliable numbers on police brutality are hard to come by, but in a statement released in 2006, the internal affairs department of Russia’s Interior Ministry said that the number of recorded crimes committed by police officers rose 46.8% in 2005. In one nationwide poll in 2005, 71% of respondents said they didn’t trust their police at all; in another, 41% Russians said they lived in fear of police violence.^[188][189] According to Amnesty International, torture of detainees in Russia is now endemic.^[184] Since 2007, police officers from outside Caucasus are now not only being sent to Chechnya, but to all the region’s republics.^[187]

The wars in Chechnya, and the associated Caucasian terrorism in Russia, were a major factor in the growth of intolerance, xenophobia, and racist violence in Russia, directed in a great part against the people from Caucasus.^[184] The Russian authorities were unlikely to label random attacks on people of non-Russian ethnicity as racist, preferring calling it «hooliganism».^{[citation needed]} The number of murders officially classified as racist more than doubled in Russia between 2003 and 2004. The violence included acts of terrorism such as the 2006 Moscow market bombing which killed 13 people.^[190][191] In 2007, 18-year-old Artur Ryno claimed responsibility for 37 racially motivated murders in the course of one year, saying that «since school [he] hated people from the Caucasus.»^[192] On 5 June 2007, an anti-Chechen riot involving hundreds of people took place in the town of Stavropol in southern Russia. Rioters demanded the eviction of ethnic Chechens following the murder of two young Russians who locals believed were killed by Chechens. The event revived memories of a recent clash between Chechens and local Russians in Kondopoga over an unpaid bill, when two Russians were killed.^[193] The Caucasians also face ethnic-related violence in the ranks of Russian Army.^[194]

Status[edit]

In 2005, there were about 60,000 Federal troops in Chechnya, but that number has since decreased significantly. Tony Wood, a journalist and author who has written extensively about Chechnya, estimated there were about 8,000 local security forces remaining in the region as of 2007. Independent analysts say there are no more than 2,000 armed terrorists combatants still fighting, while Russia says only a few hundred remain. There is still some sporadic fighting in the mountains and south of the republic, but Russia has scaled down its presence significantly leaving the local government to stabilize things further.^[153] In February 2008 the President of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dokka Umarov, spoke of «thousands of fighters» when he addressed a speech to all his fighters in the mountains.^[195]

Most of the more prominent past Chechen separatist leaders have died or have been killed, including former president Aslan Maskhadov and leading warlord and terrorist attack mastermind Shamil Basayev. Meanwhile, the fortunes of the Chechen independence movement sagged, plagued by the internal disunity between Chechen moderates and Islamist radicals and the changing global political climate after 11 September 2001, as well as the general war-weariness of the Chechen population. Large-scale fighting has been replaced by guerrilla warfare and bombings targeting federal troops and forces of the regional government, with the violence often spilling over into adjacent regions. Since 2005, the insurgency has largely shifted out of Chechnya proper and into the nearby Russian territories, such as Ingushetia and Dagestan; the Russian government, for its part, has focused on the stabilization of the North Caucasus.

Throughout the years Russian officials have often announced that the war is over. In April 2002, President Vladimir Putin’s declared that the war in Chechnya was over.^[196]
The Russian government maintains the conflict officially ended in April 2002,^[196][197] and since then has continued largely as a peacekeeping operation.

In a 10 July 2006, interview with the BBC, Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s then–prime minister and former minister of defense, said that «the war is over,» and that «the military campaign lasted only 2 years.»^[198]

Ramzan Kadyrov, the current president of the Chechnya, has also stated the war is over.^[199] Others believe the war ended in 2003 with the passage of a Moscow-backed constitutional referendum and the election of pro-Moscow president Akhmad Kadyrov, while some consider the conflict on-going.^[200] Some independent observers, including Álvaro Gil-Robles, the human rights envoy for the Council of Europe, and Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have said that the war has largely concluded as of 2006.^[201][202]

The separatists denied that the war was over, and guerrilla warfare continued throughout the North Caucasus. Colonel Sulim Yamadayev, Chechnya’s second most powerful loyalist warlord after Kadyrov, also denied that the war is over. In March 2007, Yamadayev claimed there were well over 1,000 separatists and foreign Islamic militants entrenched in the mountains of Chechnya alone: «The war is not over, the war is far from being over. What we are facing now is basically a classic partisan war and my prognosis is that it will last two, three, maybe even five more years.»^[203] According to the CIA factbook, Russia has severely disabled the Chechen separatist movement, although sporadic violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus.^[204] The overall security situation in Chechnya remains exceedingly difficult to accurately report due to the near monopoly the Russian government has on media covering the issue.^{[citation needed]} In May 2007, Amnesty International refuted claims by the government that the conflict has ended, stating «while large-scale military operations have been reduced, the conflict continues.»^[205] The strength of the separatists has for many years been unknown. Although Russia has killed a lot of separatists throughout the war, many young fighters have joined the separatists.^[206]

An estimation, based on the war reports, shows that in the past three years Federal casualties are higher than the number of coalition casualties of the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021).^{[207][208][209]}
With the abolition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate by the president of the separatist movement Dokka Umarov, the conflict in Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus is often referred to as the «War in the North Caucasus». The Russian government has given no new name to the conflict while most international observers still refer to it as a continuation of the Second Chechen War.^[210]

In late April 2008, the Human Rights Commissioner for the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg, visited Russia’s Caucasian republics. After wrapping up the week-long visit, he said he observed a number of positive developments in Chechnya, and that there was «obvious progress». He also noted that the judicial system in Chechnya was functioning properly. According to Hammarberg, missing people and the identification of missing bodies were still the two biggest human rights issues in the region, and he expressed his wish that further efforts be done to clarify the issue. President Putin responded to his comments, saying that the visit was of «great significance», and that Russia will take into account what the council had to say.^{[211][212][213]}

Counter-insurgency operations have been conducted by Russian army in Chechnya since 1999. President of Chechnya, and former separatist, Ramzan Kadyrov declared this phase to end in March 2009.^[214] On 27 March 2009, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev met with Alexander Bortnikov, the Director of the Federal Security Service to discuss the official ending of counter-terrorism operations in Chechnya. Medvedev directed the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, which Bortnikov also heads, to report to the Russian government on this issue, which will then be decided by the Russian parliament.^[215] However Medvedev asserted that situation in Chechnya must remain under direct control of the FSB.

On 16 April 2009, the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya was officially ended.^[9] As of 2009, close to 480 active insurgents were fighting in the mountains under leadership of field commander Doku Umarov according to official data.^[216] Doku Umarov was killed by poisoning in 2013.^[217] Umarov’s successor Aliaskhab Kebekov was reported killed in 2015. The «Caucasus Emirate» grouping founded by Umarov in 2007 was by 2015 largely absorbed into the ISIS-affiliated Vilayat Kavkaz led by Rustam Asilderov. Asilderov was reported killed in 2016.^[218]

On 18 October 2022, Ukraine’s parliament condemned the «genocide of the Chechen people» during the First and Second Chechen Wars.^[219][220]

See also[edit]

• Guerrilla phase of the Second Chechen War
• International response to the Second Chechen War
• Insurgency in the North Caucasus

Notes[edit]

References[edit]

Publications[edit]

• Coene, Frederik (2009). The Caucasus — An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-20302-3.

Bibliography[edit]

• «Three Worlds Gone Mad» Author: Robert Young Pelton
• A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya Author: Anna Politkovskaya
• A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya Author: David R. Stone (preview available)
• A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya Author: Anna Politkovskaya (preview available)
• Allah’s Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya Author: Sebastian Smith (preview available)
• Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad Author: James Hughes (preview available)
• Chechnya: From Past To Future Author: Richard Sakwa and others (preview available)
• Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society Author: Valery Tishkov (preview available)
• Chechnya: The Case for Independence Author: Tony Wood
• Chechnya: To the Heart of a Conflict Author: Andrew Meier
• Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya Author: Anne Nivat
• Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya Author: Vanora Bennett
• My Jihad Author: Aukai Collins
• One Soldier’s War Author: Arkady Babchenko.
• Open Wound: Chechnya 1994–2003 Author: Stanley Greene
• Putin’s Russia Author: Anna Politkovskaya
• Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994–2000: Lessons from Urban Combat Author: Olga Oliker (preview available)
• Russia’s Islamic Threat Author: Gordon M. Hahn
• Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia Author: Dmitri Trenin, Anatol Lieven (preview available)
• Russia’s Wars with Chechnya 1994–2003 Author: Michael Orr
• Russian Military Reform, 1992–2002 Author: Anne Aldis, Roger N. McDermott
• Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800–2000: A Deadly Embrace Author: Robert Seely (preview available)
• The Angel of Grozny: Orphans of a Forgotten War Author: Asne Seierstad
• The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Author: Matthew Evangelista (preview available)
• The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule Author: Moshe Gammer (preview available)
• The Oath: A Surgeon Under Fire Author: Khassan Baiev
• The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror Author: Paul J. Murphy (preview available)
• «Welcome to Hell»: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion in Chechnya Author: Human Rights Watch (preview available)

External links[edit]

Timelines and chronologies

• BBC Timeline: Chechnya

Summaries

• CHECHNYA: TWO FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS Conflict Studies Research Centre

Human rights issues

• Video: Is it safe in Chechnya? A European human rights body has described the situation in Russia’s Chechen republic as critical (21 April 2008)
• Council of Europe resolutions on ‘The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic’:
  • Resolution 1323 (2003)
  • Resolution 1403 (2004)
• Human Rights Violations in Chechnya Society for the Russian–Chechen Friendship
• The Trauma of ongoing War in Chechnya Doctors Without Borders

Articles

• «The North Caucasus,» Russian Analytical Digest No. 22 (5 June 2007)
• Critical media coverage of Chechnya stifled Archived 8 March 2007 at the Wayback Machine
• Shifting Battlefields of the Chechen War (April 2006)
• The Chechen resistance movement: 2006 in review Jamestown Foundation
• ISN Case Study: The North Caucasus on the Brink (August 2006) Archived 17 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine

Втора́я чече́нская война́^[a] (Вторая чеченская кампания; официально — часть контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона^[28]; чечен. ШолгIа оьрсийн-нохчийн тIом^[29][30]) — боевые действия и контртеррористические мероприятия на территории Чечни и приграничных регионов Северного Кавказа.

Началась 7 августа 1999 года со вторжения боевиков в Дагестан. Контртеррористическая операция (КТО) на территории Чечни была объявлена вскоре после этого, в сентябре 1999 года.

Активная фаза боевых действий продолжалась по конец февраля 2000 года и завершилась со взятием федеральными силами под контроль Шатойского района Чечни. Затем, после завершения в апреле того же года боевой части контртеррористической операции^[31], контртеррористические силы осуществили перегруппировку для долгосрочного проведения разведывательных и оперативно-розыскных мероприятий. Полномочия по руководству проведением контртеррористической операции были возложены сначала на Министерство обороны, с 22 января 2001 года — на ФСБ России, а с 1 сентября 2003 года — на МВД России. По мере установления контроля силовыми структурами Российской Федерации над территорией Чеченской Республики, территория Чечни переходила в ведение местных чеченских сил самоуправления и самообороны.

Вторая чеченская война официально завершилась с отменой в полночь 16 апреля 2009 года режима КТО^[1][32][33].

Борьба с террористическим подпольем на территории Северного Кавказа продолжалась с 2009 года по 2017 год, когда, в соответствии с заявлением директора ФСБ России Александра Бортникова, бандитское подполье было окончательно разгромлено^[34]. Вместе с тем последние группировки вооружённого подполья, по данным властей Чеченской Республики, были уничтожены в начале 2021 года^[35][36][37]. При этом, на законодательном уровне Вторая чеченская война и последовавшая борьба с терроризмом на Северном Кавказе (2009—2017) рассматриваются вместе как контртеррористические операции на территории Северо-Кавказского региона с августа 1999 года; их окончание не установлено^[28].

Предыстория

Ситуация после Хасавюрта

Во время первой чеченской войны в августе 1996 года боевики в ходе операции «Джихад» захватили Грозный, но вскоре были блокированы в нём федеральными войсками. Однако, на фоне прошедших президентских выборов, ввиду непопулярности в российском обществе чеченской кампании, российское руководство решило начать работу по скорому прекращению военных действий в Чечне. Возражения со стороны командования Объединённой группировки войск России (Г. Н. Трошева, К. Б. Пуликовского и др.) и сил Чеченской Республики (правительства Д. Г. Завгаева), настаивавших на уничтожении взятых в плотное кольцо боевиков, были проигнорированы, и 31 августа того же года полномочным представителем президента по политическому урегулированию в Чечне А. И. Лебедем с лидером самопровозглашённой Чеченской Республикой Ичкерия А. А. Масхадовым были подписаны Хасавюртовские соглашения, по результатам которых российские войска выводились из Чечни, а вопрос о её статусе откладывался до 31 декабря 2001 года^{[38][39][40][41]}. В значительной степени те соглашения обусловили самостоятельное развитие Чечни вне правовых рамок Российской Федерации^[42].

27 января 1997 года в Ичкерии прошли президентские выборы. На пост главы государства было выдвинуто более 20 кандидатур, но реальными претендентами считались 3 человека: и. о. президента ЧРИ Зелимхан Яндарбиев, начальник Главного штаба армии ЧРИ Аслан Масхадов, полевой командир Шамиль Басаев. Масхадов провозглашал своей целью создание независимого демократического светского чеченского государства. Этому должны были способствовать, на его взгляд, как установление мирных добрососедских отношений с Россией, так и укрепление взаимовыгодных контактов с Западом. Басаев и Яндарбиев позиционировали себя, как радикальные исламисты, сторонники построения шариатского государства и дистанцирования от России. Победу на выборах одержал Масхадов, набрав более 59 % голосов избирателей, принявших участие в голосовании. Второе место (23,5 %) занял Басаев, и. о. президента Яндарбиев набрал 10 %^[43]. Заняв пост председателя правительства, Масхадов пытался консолидировать вокруг себя вчерашних оппонентов. Он назначил первыми вице-премьерами Шамиля Басаева и Мовлади Удугова. Зелимхан Яндарбиев отказался работать с администрацией Масхадова и вскоре перешел в оппозицию. Это был момент наибольшей консолидации чеченского общества за весь межвоенный период. У Масхадова практически не было серьёзных политических противников, парламент также поддерживал линию президента. Но, как показали дальнейшие события, масштаб и сложность стоявших перед чеченским президентом задач оказались несовместимы с его реальными возможностями.

После того, как завершилась первая чеченская война, экономическая ситуация в сумевшей отстоять фактическую независимость, но не получившей юридического признания Чеченской Республики Ичкерии была сложная, резко упал уровень жизни населения. В межвоенный период практически полностью исчезло нечеченское население. Абсолютное большинство чеченцев практически не имело законных средств к существованию, жило нередко в разрушенных войной домах. В то же время значительное количество оружия оказалось на руках у населения самопровозглашённой республики; произошла активизация преступных группировок. Во многих селах стали создаваться никому не подчинявшиеся местные отряды ополчения. Бывшие полевые командиры стали создавать собственные банды, которые занимались рэкетом, работорговлей, распространением наркотиков, насилием и похищением людей. В частности, в Надтеречном районе в ноябре 1997 года были захвачены два гражданина Украины, приехавшие на похороны матери, в 1998 году в соседних республиках Северного Кавказа регулярно похищались и вывозились в Чечню турецкие строители и бизнесмены, в январе 1998 года во Владикавказе (Северная Осетия) похищен гражданин Франции, представитель Верховного комиссара ООН по делам беженцев Венсент Коштель. Он был освобождён в Чечне 11 месяцев спустя. 3 октября 1998 года в Грозном похищены четыре сотрудника британской фирмы «Грейнджер телеком» (в декабре они были жестоко убиты и обезглавлены^[44]). Процветал нелегальный нефтяной промысел, выпуск и распространение фальшивых денежных купюр. Восстановление экономики республики и привлечение иностранных инвестиций были невозможны в условиях уголовного беспредела.

Главным же процессом в межвоенной Чечне, фактически давшем толчок к новой войне, стал конфликт между правительством Масхадова — с одной стороны и радикальными исламистами (т. н. ваххабитами) — с другой. Так, сразу после избрания Масхадова президентом страны, они стали обвинять его в сговоре с Москвой. Ваххабиты не считали чеченскую войну оконченной и в любой момент были готовы начать боевые действия и совершать теракты. Многие известные чеченские полевые командиры (Салман Радуев, Хаттаб, Арби Бараев) открыто заявляли о том, что конечной целью противостояния является полное вытеснение России из региона и создание на Северном Кавказе независимого исламского государства. На территории Чечни были созданы лагеря для обучения боевиков — молодых людей из мусульманских регионов России. Сюда направлялись из-за рубежа инструкторы по минно-подрывному делу и исламские проповедники. Значительную роль в жизни Чечни стали играть многочисленные арабские добровольцы. Главной их целью стала дестабилизация положения в соседних с Чечнёй российских регионах и распространение идей сепаратизма на северокавказские республики (в первую очередь Дагестан, Карачаево-Черкесия, Кабардино-Балкария).

Попытки Масхадова усмирить ваххабитов только усугубили ситуацию. В марте 1998 года произошли бои между отрядами ваххабитов и войсками ЧРИ в Урус-Мартановском районе, в июне бои проходили в Грозном, в июле вспыхнул мятеж радикалов в Гудермесе, который был подавлен. Имели место провокации, направленные на дискредитацию чеченской власти в глазах мирового сообщества. Сам президент Чеченской Республики Ичкерия пережил несколько покушений, ответственность за которые была возложена на российские спецслужбы. После вооружённого мятежа в Гудермесе Масхадов объявил ваххабизм вне закона, однако за ваххабитов вступились вице-президент Чечни Ваха Арсанов и председатель правительства Шамиль Басаев, уговорившие Масхадова не углублять междоусобный конфликт. Масхадов опасался полноценной гражданской войны и возможного вторжения российской армии в случае обострения ситуации по сценарию конца 1994 года. В феврале 1999 года в качестве уступок радикальным исламистам власти Чеченской Республики Ичкерия ввели право шариата^[45] и начали осуществлять публичные казни.

Обострение обстановки

В начале марта 1999 года в аэропорту Грозного террористами был похищен полномочный представитель МВД России в Чечне генерал-майор милиции Геннадий Шпигун^[46]. Для российского руководства это было свидетельством того, что президент ЧРИ Масхадов не в состоянии самостоятельно бороться с терроризмом^[47]. Федеральный центр предпринял меры по усилению борьбы с чеченскими бандформированиями: были вооружены отряды самообороны и усилены милицейские подразделения по всему периметру Чечни, на Северный Кавказ были отправлены ведущие оперативные сотрудники подразделений по борьбе с этнической организованной преступностью, со стороны Ставрополья были выставлены несколько ракетных установок «Точка-У», предназначенных для нанесения точечных ударов^[46][47]. Была введена экономическая блокада Чечни, приведшая к тому, что денежный поток из России стал резко иссякать.

Из-за ужесточения режима на границе всё труднее стало переправлять в Россию наркотики и захватывать заложников. Бензин, изготавливаемый на подпольных заводах, стало невозможно вывезти за пределы Чечни. Была также усилена борьба с чеченскими преступными группировками, активно финансировавшими боевиков в Чечне. В мае-июле 1999 года чечено-дагестанская граница превратилась в милитаризованную зону. В результате доходы чеченских полевых командиров резко сократились, и у них возникли проблемы с закупкой оружия и платой наёмникам^[46][48].

В апреле 1999 года главкомом внутренних войск МВД России был назначен Вячеслав Овчинников, успешно руководивший рядом операций во время Первой чеченской войны^[46]. В мае 1999 года российские вертолёты нанесли ракетный удар по позициям боевиков Хаттаба на реке Терек в ответ на попытку бандформирований захватить заставу внутренних войск на чечено-дагестанской границе. После этого глава МВД Владимир Рушайло заявил о подготовке крупномасштабных превентивных ударов^[46].

Тем временем чеченские бандформирования под командованием Шамиля Басаева и Хаттаба готовились к вооружённому вторжению в Дагестан. С апреля по август 1999 года, проводя разведку боем, они только в Ставрополье и Дагестане совершили более 30 вылазок, в результате которых погибли и получили ранения несколько десятков военнослужащих, сотрудников правоохранительных органов и гражданских лиц^[6][46]. Поняв, что на кизлярском и хасавюртовском направлениях сосредоточены наиболее сильные группировки федеральных войск, боевики решили нанести удар по горной части Дагестана. При выборе этого направления бандформирования исходили из того, что там нет войск, а в кратчайшие сроки перебросить силы в этот труднодоступный район не удастся. Кроме того, боевики рассчитывали на возможный удар в тыл федеральных сил со стороны Кадарской зоны Дагестана, с августа 1998 года контролируемой местными ваххабитами^[49].

Как отмечают исследователи, дестабилизация обстановки на Северном Кавказе была выгодна многим. Прежде всего исламским фундаменталистам, стремящимся к распространению своего влияния на весь мир, а также арабским нефтяным шейхам и финансовым олигархам стран Персидского залива, не заинтересованным в начале эксплуатации нефтегазовых месторождений Каспия^[49].

Вторжение боевиков в Дагестан

7 августа 1999 года с территории Чечни было совершено массированное вторжение боевиков в Дагестан под общим командованием Шамиля Басаева и арабского полевого командира Хаттаба с целью поддержки местных исламистов, провозгласивших шариатское правление в четырёх сёлах Цумадинского района. Ядро группировки боевиков составляли иностранные наёмники и бойцы «Исламской международной миротворческой бригады»,^[6] связанной с «Аль-Каидой»^[50]. План боевиков по переходу на их сторону населения Дагестана провалился, дагестанцы оказали вторгшимся бандитам отчаянное сопротивление^[51]. Российские власти предложили ичкерийскому руководству провести совместную с федеральными силами операцию против исламистов в Дагестане. Было также предложено «решить вопрос о ликвидации баз, мест складирования и отдыха незаконных вооружённых формирований, от которых чеченское руководство всячески открещивается»^[52][53]. Аслан Масхадов на словах осудил нападения на Дагестан и их организаторов и вдохновителей, однако реальных мер для противодействия им не предпринял^[54].

Более месяца шли бои федеральных сил с вторгшимися боевиками, закончившиеся тем, что боевики были вынуждены отступить с территории Дагестана обратно в Чечню. В эти же дни — 4—16 сентября — в нескольких городах России (Москве, Волгодонске и Буйнакске) была осуществлена серия террористических актов — взрывы жилых домов, ответственность за которые была возложена на чеченских террористов. Впоследствии в своей книге «ФСБ взрывает Россию» эмигрировавший из России бывший сотрудник ФСБ Александр Литвиненко и живущий в США историк Юрий Фельштинский выдвинули версию, по которой взрывы были совершены российскими спецслужбами с целью подготовить общественное мнение к приходу нового политического лидера.

Начало военной операции в Чечне

В начале сентября 1999 года российским руководством было принято решение о проведении военной операции по уничтожению боевиков на территории Чечни^[55][56]. 18 сентября границы Чечни были блокированы российскими войсками.

23 сентября президент России Борис Ельцин подписал секретный указ № 1255с «О мерах по повышению эффективности контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации» (рассекречен в 2001 году)^[57]. Указ предусматривал создание Объединённой группировки войск на Северном Кавказе для проведения контртеррористической операции^[51].

В тот же день российские войска начали массированные бомбардировки Грозного и его окрестностей, 30 сентября они вошли на территорию Чечни.

Характер

Сломив сопротивление боевиков силами армейских частей и внутренних войск МВД (командование российских войск успешно применяет военные хитрости, такие, к примеру, как заманивание боевиков на минные поля, рейды по тылам противника и многие другие), Россия сделала ставку на «чеченизацию» конфликта и переманиванию на свою сторону части элиты и бывших участников чеченских вооружённых формирований. Так, во главу администрации Чечни в 2000 года назначили бывшего сторонника сепаратистов, главный муфтий Чечни Ахмат Кадыров. Боевики, напротив, сделали ставку на интернационализацию конфликта, вовлекая в свою борьбу вооружённые отряды нечеченского происхождения. К началу 2005 года, после уничтожения Масхадова, Хаттаба, Абу аль-Валида и многих других полевых командиров, интенсивность диверсионно-террористической деятельности боевиков значительно снизилась. За 2005—2008 годы в России не было совершено ни одного крупного теракта, а единственная масштабная операция боевиков (Рейд на Кабардино-Балкарию 13 октября 2005 года) завершилась полным провалом.

Генерал КГБ Филипп Бобков, известный своей борьбой с бандформированиями в советское время, в 2005 году дал такую характеристику действиям чеченского сопротивления: «Эти операции мало чем отличаются от боевых действий израильтян до создания их государства на территории Палестины, а затем палестинских экстремистов на территории Израиля или ныне албанских вооружённых формирований в Косово»^[58].

Ход войны

Активная боевая фаза

Наземная войсковая операция на территории Чечни началась 30 сентября 1999 года. В ответ президент ЧРИ Масхадов объявил России газават (священную войну). За полмесяца федеральным силам, не встречая особого сопротивления, удалось занять треть территории Чечни к северу от реки Терек. Вооруженные формирования Ичкерии отступили в Грозный и в горы. На этих рубежах Масхадов надеялся организовать серьезный отпор врагу. За ноябрь-декабрь были взяты Гудермес, Ачхой-Мартан, Аргун, Урус-Мартан, Ханкалу, Шали^[59].

Российским войскам удалось окружить и блокировать Грозный к началу ноября 1999 года, однако вплоть до 6 февраля 2000 года в столице республики продолжались ожесточённые бои. Длительные артобстрелы и авианалёты почти сравняли Грозный с землёй. В 2003 году ООН назвала Грозный самым разрушенным городом на Земле^[60].

Неожиданная атака отряда чеченских сепаратистов на Шали и Аргун в начале 2000 года остановила наступление федеральных войск. С деблокированием Шали и Аргуна бои продолжились, в начале февраля 2000 года чеченские террористы, пытаясь вырваться из окружения в Грозном, понесли большие потери на минных полях, однако всё же смогли прорваться в Аргунское ущелье^[61]. В январе-феврале 2000 года российские войска освободили Ножай-Юрт, Ведено, Сержень-Юрт, Итум-Кали и Шатой.

В конце февраля блокированные в Аргунском ущелье боевики попытались вырваться из окружения федеральных войск. В ходе сражения за Шатой боевики потеряли последний стратегический населённый пункт и двумя крупными группами пошли на прорыв. Первая группа во главе с Басаевым и Хаттабом наткнулась на позиции 6-й роты псковских десантников на высоте 776, где произошёл крупный бой. Вторая группа во главе с Русланом Гелаевым в марте 2000 года захватила село Комсомольское. Российское командование развернуло крупномасштабную военную операцию и сумело вернуть контроль над селом. Гелаев вместе с остатками своего отряда сумел вырваться из окружения.

20 апреля 2000 года первый замначальника Генштаба России Валерий Манилов заявил, что широкомасштабные боевые действия в Чечне закончились. 23 января 2001 года президент Путин принял решение о частичном выводе российских войск из республики. Главой Чечни был назначен бывший верховный муфтий Ичкерии Ахмат Кадыров. Организованное вооружённое сопротивление федеральным властям в Чечне прекратилось весной 2000 года, но в последующие годы шла длительная партизанская война^[62].

Повстанческая фаза

В период после прекращения полномасштабной войсковой операции в апреле 2000 года на территории Чечни и в соседних регионах продолжали происходить вооружённые нападения и теракты. Против боевиков воевали как российские подразделения, так и чеченские силы, поддерживавшие федеральную власть — кадыровцы.

Чеченские сепаратисты продолжили войну против федеральных властей, перейдя к тактике диверсий и террора. Только в первый год после отмены КТО в Чечне произошло пять подрывов на железной дороге, шесть терактов с человеческими жертвами среди мирного населения. Боевики провели несколько крупных рейдов, включая нападение на второй по величине город Гудермес в сентябре 2001 года и атаку отряда Руслана Гелаева на Ингушетию в сентябре 2002 года.

В 2002 году в результате спецоперации ФСБ был ликвидирован лидер иностранных боевиков в Чечне Хаттаб. Два года спустя был ликвидирован и его преемник Абу аль-Валид. В 2006 году был уничтожен последний крупный командир иностранных боевиков Абу Хафс аль-Урдани.

В конце 2003 года попытка боевиков отряда Руслана Гелаева попасть в Панкисское ущелье (Грузия) через территорию Дагестана привела к двухмесячному вооружённому противостоянию с применением тяжёлой техники и авиации. Итогом стала ликвидация большей части террористов, включая самого Гелаева.

Самыми крупными терактами этого периода второй чеченской войны, связанными с войной, стали захват театрального центра на Дубровке в Москве (2002) и школы в Беслане в Северной Осетии (2004). В результате теракта в Грозном в мае 2004 года погиб глава Чеченской Республики Ахмат Кадыров. За эти теракты взял на себя ответственность лидер боевиков Шамиль Басаев.

В марте 2005 года в ходе спецоперации ФСБ в селе Толстой-Юрт был уничтожен президент Ичкерии Аслан Масхадов. В 2006 году был уничтожен его преемник Абдул-Халим Садулаев. Возглавивший сепаратистов Доку Умаров объявил в 2007 году о ликвидации Ичкерии и образовании «Имарата Кавказ» (запрещён в России как террористическая организация).

31 января 2006 года Владимир Путин заявил, что можно говорить об окончании контртеррористической операции в Чечне.

В июле 2006 года в результате спецоперации российских спецслужб был уничтожен лидер сепаратистов и террорист № 1 Шамиль Басаев.

С отменой КТО 16 апреля 2009 года и официальным завершением войны нападения боевиков как в Чечне, так и за её пределами не прекратились.

Борьба с терроризмом на Северном Кавказе после 2009 года

После отмены режима КТО в Чечне террористическое подполье активизировалось в других регионах Кавказа, в первую очередь в Дагестане. В начале 2010-х боевики Имарата Кавказ совершили несколько крупных терактов в Москве и Волгограде. Режимы КТО вводились многократно в отдельных местностях Дагестана, Чечни, Ингушетии, Кабардино-Балкарии и реже других регионов. В результате антитеррористической деятельности МВД и ФСБ России к середине 2010-х бандподполье на Северном Кавказе было разгромлено, лидеры боевиков уничтожены. Последняя группа повстанцев была уничтожена в январе 2021 года.

Командование

Руководители Регионального оперативного штаба по проведению контртеррористической операции на Северном Кавказе (2001—2006 гг.)

Региональный оперативный штаб (РОШ) создан Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 22 января 2001 г. № 61 «О мерах по борьбе с терроризмом на территории Северо-Каваказского региона Российской Федерации».

В 2006 году на базе РОШ создан Оперативный штаб Чеченской Республики по проведению контртеррористической операции.

Командующие Объединённой группировкой войск (сил) по проведению контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации (с 1999 г.)

Объединённая группировка образована Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 23 сентября 1999 г. № 1255с «О мерах по повышению эффективности контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации».

• Виктор Казанцев (сентябрь 1999 — февраль 2000)
• Геннадий Трошев (и. о. февраль — март 2000^[* 2], командующий апрель — июнь 2000)
• Александр Баранов (и. о. март 2000^[* 2])
• Валерий Баранов (и. о. июль — сентябрь 2000, командующий сентябрь 2000 — октябрь 2001, сентябрь 2003 — май 2004)
• Владимир Молтенской (и. о. май — август 2001^[* 3], командующий октябрь 2001 — сентябрь 2002)
• Сергей Макаров (и. о. июль — август 2002^[* 4], командующий октябрь 2002 — сентябрь 2003)
• Михаил Паньков (и. о. май 2004^[* 5])
• Вячеслав Дадонов (и. о. июнь 2004 — июль 2005^[* 5])
• Евгений Лазебин (июль 2005 — июнь 2006)
• Евгений Баряев (июнь — декабрь 2006)
• Яков Недобитко (декабрь 2006 — январь 2008)
• Николай Сивак (январь 2008 — август 2011)

Нарушения прав человека

По оценкам правозащитной организации Amnesty International, Вторая чеченская война сопровождалась систематическим нарушением прав человека, включая внесудебные казни и пытки, которые совершались как сотрудниками силовых структур, так и чеченскими боевиками. Большая часть таких преступлений до сих пор остаётся безнаказанными, хотя в отдельных случаях пострадавшим удалось получить компенсацию от российского правительства по решениям Европейского суда^[63].

Обвинения в адрес правительственных силовых структур РФ и их юридические последствия

В октябре 2000 года организация Human Rights Watch (HRW) опубликовала свой 99-страничный доклад «Добро пожаловать в ад», о том, как российскими войсками были задержаны тысячи чеченцев, при этом многие без каких бы то ни было доказательств правонарушений. Охранники центров содержания под стражей систематически избивали чеченских заключённых, некоторые из них также подвергались изнасилованиям или другим формам пыток. Большинство из них были освобождены только после того, как их семьи заплатили крупные взятки российским чиновникам. HRW отметила, что, несмотря на резолюцию Комиссии ООН по правам человека, призывающую Россию срочно создать национальную комиссию по расследованию, которая установила бы ответственность за злоупотребления, российские власти не допускают «любых заслуживающих доверия и прозрачных усилий по расследованию этих нарушений и привлечению виновных к ответственности»^[64].

В марте 2001 года HRW в своём докладе указала восемь не обозначенных захоронений в Чечне, которые были обнаружены в 2000—2001 годах^[65]. Также организацией были отмечены восемь случаев, когда тела бросались по обочинам дорог, на территории госпиталей и других местах. Общество «Мемориал» также зафиксировало много подобных случаев. Большинство этих тел имело следы выстрелов с близкого расстояния, характерные для внесудебных расправ, и увечья. Врачебные осмотры некоторых жертв показали, что часть увечий была нанесена ещё живым людям^[66], что указывает на факты применения жестоких пыток по отношению к жертвам. 29 марта 2001 года Верховный комиссар ООН по правам человека Мэри Робинсон призвала к тщательному исследованию массовых захоронений в Чечне^[67].

В 2003 году местные жители и правозащитники утверждали, что фрагменты взорванных тел находили по всему разрушенному войной региону. Критики говорили, что вместо того, чтобы положить конец нарушениям прав человека, военные всячески пытаются скрыть их. Семьи убитых сообщали, что российские войска вымогают выкуп за тела жертв^[68]. 31 марта 2003 года Уполномоченный по правам человека в Российской Федерации Олег Миронов призвал власти открыть места массовых захоронений для идентификации тел, установления причин смерти и захоронения. В то же время, Миронов отклонил предложение Парламентской ассамблеи Совета Европы о создании международного трибунала для расследования предполагаемых военных преступлений, совершённых в Чечне^[69].

В феврале 2003 года Чечню посетил комиссар Совета Европы по правам человека Альваро Хиль-Роблес, который высказался за референдум по принятию конституции Чеченской республики и объективное расследование совершённых преступлений с обеих сторон конфликта. Говоря о праве народов на самоопределение, он подчёркивал, что общая идея Европы и ЕС—уважение к суверенности границ. Бороться за сепаратистские идеи можно, но только мирным путём. Первым и фундаментальным правом человека он назвал право на жизнь, а идею независимости—требованием второго порядка^[70].

Жертвы

Потери военнослужащих Министерства обороны к сентябрю 2008 года составили 3684 человека погибшими. Также известно, что к августу 2003 года погибло 1055 военнослужащих внутренних войск, а ФСБ по состоянию на 2002 год потеряла 202 человек убитыми^[4]. В апреле 2010 года министр внутренних дел России Рашид Нургалиев сообщил, что за десять лет в Чечне погибли 2178 сотрудников органов внутренних дел^[5]. Таким образом, если просуммировать вышеуказанные цифры, то итоговые потери российских силовых ведомств (МО, МВД, ФСБ) в Чечне составляют более 6000 человек погибшими.

В июне 2010 года главком внутренних войск МВД Николай Рогожкин впервые озвучил официальные цифры потерь российских внутренних войск в ходе первой и второй войн в Чечне. По его данным, всего за время боевых действий погибли 2984 человека, ещё 9 тысяч получили ранения^[6].

По данным федеральной стороны, на 31 декабря 2000 года потери боевиков составляли более 10 800 человек^[16]. В июле 2002 года сообщалось о 13 517 уничтоженных боевиках^[17]. По другим же данным, на начало 2001 года было уничтожено более 15 000 боевиков^[18].

В литературе, кино, музыке

Книги

• Трошев Геннадий Николаевич. «Чеченский рецидив. Записки командующего.» (2003) — воспоминания генерала Трошева Г. Н.
• Анисимов С. В. Дойти и рассказать (2004)
• Аркадий Бабченко. «Алхан-Юрт» (2006) — собрание повестей и рассказов.
• Алла Дудаева. «Миллион первый» (2005) — биография Джохара Дудаева, написанная его женой^[71]
• Полина Жеребцова. Дневник Жеребцовой Полины. — М.: Детектив-Пресс, 2011. — 576 с. — ISBN 978-5-89935-101-3.
• Полина Жеребцова. Муравей в стеклянной банке. Чеченские дневники 1994-2004 гг.. — М.: АСТ, 2014. — 608 с. — ISBN 978-5-17-083653-6.
• Тонкая серебристая нить (рассказы), (2015) — сборник рассказов Полины Жеребцовой, в котором отражена жизнь мирных жителей в городе Грозном в период чеченских войн.
• Александр Карасёв. Чеченские рассказы. — М.: Литературная Россия, 2008. — 320 с. — ISBN 978-5-7809-0114-3.
• Александр Карасёв. Предатель. — : Вагант, 2011. — 256 с. — ISBN 978-5-9635-0344-7.
• Кузьмина, Светлана Ивановна. «Два года в аду. Документальная повесть»
• Манякин Л. В. Чеченские мотивы. /Рассказ/ Астана: ТОО «Мастер По», 2016. — 150 с. ISBN 978-601-301-745-7.
• Петров, Виктор Евгеньевич. «Два Кавказа Виктора Петрова»
• Константин Сазонов. Фома верующий (2015). — ISBN 978-5-447-41383-5. Роман о сложном возвращении человека в мирную жизнь после чеченской войны.
• Константин Семёнов. Грозненский роман (2009). Издавался также под названием «Нас предала Родина».
• Юлия Юзик, Невесты Аллаха. Лица и судьбы всех женщин-шахидок, взорвавшихся в России (2003) — журналистское расследование того, кто и как делает из обычных женщин террористок-смертниц.

Фильмы и сериалы

Песни

Второй чеченской войне посвящены песни:

См. также

Примечания

Комментарии

Источники

Литература

• Контртеррористические операции на Северном Кавказе (1999—2000) // Конго — Крещение. — М. : Большая российская энциклопедия, 2010. — С. 156. — (Большая российская энциклопедия : [в 35 т.] / гл. ред. Ю. С. Осипов ; 2004—2017, т. 15). — ISBN 978-5-85270-346-0.
• Трошев Г. Н. Моя война. Чеченский дневник окопного генерала. — М.: Вагриус, 2001. — 211 с. — 15 000 экз. — ISBN 5-264-00657-1.
• Мяло К. Г. Россия и последние войны XX века (1989—2000). К истории падения сверхдержавы. — М.: Вече, 2002. — 480 с.
• Тренин Д. В. Время Юга: Россия в Чечне, Чечня в России (совместно с Алексеем Малашенко). Моск. Центр Карнеги. — М.: Гендальф, 2002.
• Осмаев А. Д. Общественно-политическая и повседневная жизнь Чеченской Республики в 1996—2005 гг.: автореферат диссертации … доктора исторических наук: 07.00.02. — ИИАЭ ДНЦ РАН. — Махачкала, 2010. — 54 с.
• Galeotti M. Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994—2009 (англ.). — Oxford — New York: Osprey Publishing, 2014. — 96 p. — (Essential Histories, 78). — ISBN 978-1-78200-278-9.
• Усиков А. В., Спирин А. Н., Божедомов Б. А., Кикнадзе В. Г. Государственное и военное управление в ходе внутренних вооруженных конфликтов на северном Кавказе (конец ХХ — начало XXI века). Часть 2. Контртеррористические операции на Северном Кавказе в 1999—2006 гг. // Военно-исторический журнал. — 2012. — № 3. — С. 3-10.

Ссылки

• Вторая чеченская война: Победа, которой не было (февраль 2000 — октябрь 2002)
• Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. Северо-Кавказский военный округ. Историческая справка. Официальный сайт Министерства обороны России. Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006. Архивировано из оригинала 22 марта 2007 года.
• Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. Федеральным силам в Чечне противостоят 22 тыс. боевиков. (недоступная ссылка — история). Архивировано 18 февраля 2012 года.
• Секретарь Союза комитетов солдатских матерей России Валентина Мельникова. Комитет солдатских матерей утверждает, что во второй чеченской войне погибли 12 000 человек. Newsru.com (8 августа 2003). Дата обращения: 1 января 2007.
• Нарушение прав человека и норм гуманитарного права в ходе вооружённого конфликта в Чечне. Часть 3. Сентябрь–ноябрь 1999 года. Обстрелы и бомбардировки. Общество «Мемориал» (2002). Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006.
• Политковская А. С. Накрытый рынок. «Контртеррористическая операция» начиналась с чудовищного преступления. Новая газета (27 октября 2005). Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006.
• Сайт «Чечня.ру». Хроника штурма Грозного (1999-2000 гг.) (3 марта 2006). Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006. Архивировано из оригинала 19 февраля 2012 года.

• Юрий Щекочихин, заместитель председателя комитета по безопасности ГД РФ. Правда о гибели подмосковного ОМОНа. Новая газета (26 марта 2001). Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006. Архивировано из оригинала 24 октября 2013 года.
• «Новый Регион – Пермь». Сегодня – пятая годовщина со дня гибели пермского отряда ОМОН. Новый регион (29 марта 2005). Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006. Архивировано из оригинала 29 февраля 2012 года.
• Екатерина Минеева. Вчера стало известно, что взрыв в Аргуне в июле 2000 года - дело рук полевых командиров Хаттаба и Арби Бараева (18 июня 2002). Дата обращения: 7 ноября 2006. Архивировано из оригинала 21 июля 2010 года.
• Валерий Киселёв. Нижегородцы на чеченской войне.
• Гусейнов В. А. Эволюция позиции Запада в чеченском кризисе // Независимая газета. — 2000.
• Кандидат военных наук Г. Ф. Кривошеев «Антитеррористическая операция на Северном Кавказе (август 1999—2000 г.)».
• Мониторинг событийно-информационной ситуации Второй чеченской войны.
• Авиация во Второй Чеченской Войне.
• Отлов и отстрел чеченских полевых командиров.
• Андрей Савельвев «Чёрная книга Чеченской войны (2000)».
• Контртеррористические операции в Ингушетии в 2003—2007 // РИА Новости, 25 января 2008.
• Дагестан: хроника террора (1996—2017 гг.) Архивная копия от 2 августа 2015 на Wayback Machine // Кавказский узел, 19.05.2017
• 20 лет спустя: главное о Второй чеченской войне // Кавказский узел, 01.10.2019
• Чечня: дорога к миру // Президент.рф.
• Владимир Виноградов. Как я поехал на войну в Чечню (видео).
• Дневник Жеребцовой Полины (видео).

Эта страница в последний раз была отредактирована 12 марта 2023 в 20:55.

Как только страница обновилась в Википедии она обновляется в Вики 2.
Обычно почти сразу, изредка в течении часа.

Вторая чеченская война Контртеррористическая операция в Чечне
Основной конфликт: Чеченский конфликт
Дата	7 августа 1999 — 15 апреля 2009[1] (активная боевая фаза — до лета 2000 года)
Место	Чечня, затем весь Северный Кавказ Панкисское ущелье (Грузия)
Причина	вторжение исламистских боевиков в Дагестан с территории ЧРИ; террористические акты 4—16 сентября
Итог	Победа России
Изменения	ликвидация ЧРИ; вялотекущий конфликт продолжился
Противники
Россия ЧРИ (1999—2007)  Кавказский эмират (с 2007 года) Иностранные боевики при поддержке:  Аль-Каида[2]
Командующие
Борис Ельцин Владимир Путин Дмитрий Медведев Казанцев Виктор Германович Трошев Геннадий Николаевич Шаманов Владимир Анатольевич Болховитин Евгений Васильевич Лисинский Николай Павлович Корабельников Валентин Владимирович Квашнин Анатолий Васильевич Баранов Александр Иванович Молтенской Владимир Ильич Ахмад Кадыров † Рамзан Кадыров Джабраил Ямадаев † Сулим Ямадаев † Руслан Ямадаев † Саид-Магомед Какиев Аслан Масхадов † Абдул-Халим Сайдулаев † Доку Умаров Зелимхан Яндарбиев † Ахмед Закаев Руслан Гелаев † Шамиль Басаев † Ваха Арсанов † Арби Бараев † Абдул-Малик Межидов Сулейман Эльмурзаев † Хункар-Паша Исрапилов † Асламбек Исмаилов † Салман Радуев # † Турпал-Али Атгериев # † Раппани Халилов † Асламбек Абдулхаджиев † Хаттаб † Абу аль-Валид † Абу Хафс аль-Урдани † Абу Умар † Абу Омар ас-Сейф † Абу Дзейт † Абу-Кутейб †
Силы сторон
80 000 военнослужащих[3] 22 000 боевиков [3]
Потери
Более 7.385 погибших[4][5][6][7][8] по разным данным федеральной стороны, от 13517 (на 2002 год) до свыше 19 000 (на 2001 год) боевиков[9][10][11]
Общие потери
см. Людские потери во Второй чеченской войне
Аудио, фото, видео на Викискладе

Втора́я чече́нская война́ (официально называлась контртеррористической операцией на Северном Кавказе (КТО)^[12] — обиходное название боевых действий на территории Чечни и приграничных регионов Северного Кавказа. Началась 7 августа 1999 года (дата Вторжения боевиков в Дагестан). Активная фаза боевых действий продолжалась с 1999 по 2000 год, затем, по мере установления контроля Вооружёнными силами России над территорией Чечни, перешла в ведение местных чеченских сил самоуправления и самообороны. С 0 часов 16 апреля 2009 года режим КТО был отменён.^[13]

Предыстория[править | править вики-текст]

После подписания Хасавюртовских соглашений и вывода российских войск в 1996 году мира и спокойствия в Чечне и прилегающих к ней регионах не наступило.

Чеченские криминальные структуры безнаказанно делали бизнес на массовых похищениях людей. Регулярно происходил захват заложников с целью выкупа — как официальных российских представителей, так и иностранных граждан, работавших в Чечне — журналистов, сотрудников гуманитарных организаций, религиозных миссионеров и даже людей, приезжавших на похороны родственников. В частности, в Надтеречном районе в ноябре 1997 года были захвачены два гражданина Украины, приехавшие на похороны матери, в 1998 году в соседних республиках Северного Кавказа регулярно похищались и вывозились в Чечню турецкие строители и бизнесмены, в январе 1998 года во Владикавказе /Северная Осетия/ похищен гражданин Франции, представитель Верховного комиссара ООН по делам беженцев Венсент Коштель. Он был освобожден в Чечне 11 месяцев спустя, 3 октября 1998 г. в Грозном похищены четыре сотрудника британской фирмы «Грейнджер телеком», в декабре они были жестоко убиты и обезглавлены^[14]). Бандиты наживались на хищениях нефти из нефтепроводов и нефтяных скважин, производстве и контрабанде наркотиков, выпуске и распространении фальшивых денежных купюр, терактах и нападениях на соседние российские регионы. На территории Чечни были созданы лагеря для обучения боевиков — молодых людей из мусульманских регионов России. Сюда направлялись из-за рубежа инструкторы по минно-подрывному делу и исламские проповедники. Значительную роль в жизни Чечни стали играть многочисленные арабские добровольцы. Главной их целью стала дестабилизация положения в соседних с Чечнёй российских регионах и распространение идей сепаратизма на северокавказские республики (в первую очередь Дагестан, Карачаево-Черкесия, Кабардино-Балкария).

В начале марта 1999 года в аэропорту Грозного террористами был похищен полномочный представитель МВД РФ в Чечне Геннадий Шпигун.^[15] Для российского руководства это было свидетельством того, что президент ЧРИ Масхадов не в состоянии самостоятельно бороться с терроризмом.^[16] Федеральный центр предпринял меры по усилению борьбы с чеченскими бандформированиями: были вооружены отряды самообороны и усилены милицейские подразделения по всему периметру Чечни, на Северный Кавказ были отправлены лучшие оперативники подразделений по борьбе с этнической оргпреступностью, со стороны Ставрополья были выставлены несколько ракетных установок «Точка-У», предназначенных для нанесения точечных ударов.^[15][16] Была введена экономическая блокада Чечни, приведшая к тому, что денежный поток из России стал резко иссякать. Из-за ужесточения режима на границе всё труднее стало переправлять в Россию наркотики и захватывать заложников. Бензин, изготавливаемый на подпольных заводах, стало невозможно вывезти за пределы Чечни. Была также усилена борьба с чеченскими преступными группировками, активно финансировавшими боевиков в Чечне. В мае-июле 1999 года чечено-дагестанская граница превратилась в милитаризованную зону. В результате доходы чеченских полевых командиров резко сократились и у них возникли проблемы с закупкой оружия и платой наёмникам.^[15][17] В апреле 1999 главкомом внутренних войск был назначен Вячеслав Овчинников, успешно руководивший рядом операций во время Первой чеченской войны.^[15] В мае 1999 российские вертолёты нанесли ракетный удар по позициям боевиков Хаттаба на реке Терек в ответ на попытку бандформирований захватить заставу внутренних войск на чечено-дагестанской границе. После этого глава МВД Владимир Рушайло заявил о подготовке крупномасштабных превентивных ударов.^[15]

Тем временем чеченские бандформирования под командованием Шамиля Басаева и Хаттаба готовились к вооружённому вторжению в Дагестан. С апреля по август 1999, проводя разведку боем, они только в Ставрополье и Дагестане совершили более 30 вылазок, в результате которых погибли и получили ранения несколько десятков военнослужащих, сотрудников правоохранительных органов и гражданских лиц.^[3][15] Поняв, что на кизлярском и хасавюртовском направлениях сосредоточены наиболее сильные группировки федеральных войск, боевики решили нанести удар по горной части Дагестана. При выборе этого направления бандформирования исходили из того, что там нет войск, а в кратчайшие сроки перебросить силы в этот труднодоступный район не удастся. Кроме того, боевики рассчитывали на возможный удар в тыл федеральных сил со стороны Кадарской зоны Дагестана, с августа 1998 года контролируемой местными ваххабитами.^[18]

Как отмечают исследователи, дестабилизация обстановки на Северном Кавказе была выгодна многим. Прежде всего исламским фундаменталистам, стремящимся к распространению своего влияния на весь мир, а также арабским нефтяным шейхам и финансовым олигархам стран Персидского залива, не заинтересованным в начале эксплуатации нефтегазовых месторождений Каспия.^[18]

7 августа 1999 с территории Чечни было совершено массированное вторжение боевиков в Дагестан под общим командованием Шамиля Басаева и арабского полевого командира Хаттаба. Ядро группировки боевиков составляли иностранные наёмники и бойцы «Исламской международной миротворческой бригады»,^[3] связанной с «Аль-Каидой».^[19] План боевиков по переходу на их сторону населения Дагестана провалился, дагестанцы оказали вторгшимся бандитам отчаянное сопротивление.^[20] Российские власти предложили ичкерийскому руководству провести совместную с федеральными силами операцию против исламистов в Дагестане. Было также предложено «решить вопрос о ликвидации баз, мест складирования и отдыха незаконных вооруженных формирований, от которых чеченское руководство всячески открещивается».^[21][22] Аслан Масхадов на словах осудил нападения на Дагестан и их организаторов и вдохновителей, однако реальных мер для противодействия им не предпринял.

Более месяца шли бои федеральных сил с вторгшимися боевиками, закончившиеся тем, что боевики были вынуждены отступить с территории Дагестана обратно в Чечню. В эти же дни — 4—16 сентября — в нескольких городах России (Москве, Волгодонске и Буйнакске) была осуществлена серия террористических актов — взрывы жилых домов.

Учитывая неспособность Масхадова контролировать ситуацию в Чечне,^[23] российским руководством было принято решение о проведении военной операции по уничтожению боевиков на территории Чечни. 18 сентября границы Чечни были блокированы российскими войсками.

23 сентября президент России Борис Ельцин подписал указ «О мерах по повышению эффективности контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации». Указ предусматривал создание Объединённой группировки войск на Северном Кавказе для проведения контртеррористической операции.^[20]

23 сентября российские войска начали массированные бомбардировки Грозного и его окрестностей, 30 сентября они вошли на территорию Чечни.

Характер[править | править вики-текст]

Сломив сопротивление боевиков силами армейских частей и внутренних войск МВД (командование российских войск успешно применяет военные хитрости, такие, к примеру, как заманивание боевиков на минные поля, рейды по тылам противника и многие другие), Кремль сделал ставку на «чеченизацию» конфликта и переманиванию на свою сторону части элиты и бывших участников чеченских вооружённых формирований. Так, во главе прокремлевской администрации Чечни в 2000 стал бывший сторонник сепаратистов, главный муфтий Чечни Ахмат Кадыров. Боевики, напротив, сделали ставку на интернационализацию конфликта, вовлекая в свою борьбу вооруженные отряды нечеченского происхождения. К началу 2005, после уничтожения Масхадова, Хаттаба, Бараева, Абу аль-Валида и многих других полевых командиров, интенсивность диверсионно-террористической деятельности боевиков значительно снизилась. За 2005—2008 в России не было совершено ни одного крупного теракта, а единственная масштабная операция боевиков (Рейд на Кабардино-Балкарию 13 октября 2005) завершилась полным провалом. Однако с 2010 года отмечены несколько крупных терактов (см. Взрывы в московском метро (2010), Террористический акт во Владикавказе (2010), Террористический акт в аэропорту Домодедово).

Генерал КГБ Филипп Бобков в 2005 году дал такую характеристику действиям чеченского сопротивления: «Эти операции мало чем отличаются от боевых действий израильтян до создания их государства на территории Палестины, а затем палестинских экстремистов на территории Израиля или ныне албанских вооруженных формирований в Косово»^[24].

Обострение ситуации на Северном Кавказе в 2009 году[править | править вики-текст]

16 апреля 2009 года в Шатойском районе произошел бой между участниками вооруженных формирований и военными^[25]. Боевики, ведущие партизанскую войну, активизировались, участились случаи террористических актов. Начиная с осени 2009 был проведён ряд крупных спецопераций по ликвидации бандформирований и лидеров боевиков. В ответ была совершена серия терактов, в том числе, впервые за долгое время, в Москве.

Боевые столкновения, теракты и полицейские операции активно происходили не только на территории Чечни, но и на территории Ингушетии, Дагестана, и Кабардино-Балкарии. На отдельных территориях неоднократно временно вводился режим КТО. Например, 20 апреля режим КТО вводился Итум-Калинском и части Веденского района. А 23 апреля в «зону проведения КТО попали вся территория Веденского, Шатойский и часть предгорного Шалинского района Чечни.^[26] Многие жители Чечни заявляли, что не почувствовали перемен в республике после отмены КТО, а сама отмена режима, по их мнению, носила формальный характер и преследовала, в первую очередь, политические цели.^[26]

Командование[править | править вики-текст]

Руководители Регионального оперативного штаба по проведению контртеррористической операции на Северном Кавказе (2001—2006 гг.)

Региональный оперативный штаб (РОШ) создан Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 22 января 2001 г. № 61 «О мерах по борьбе с терроризмом на территории Северо-Каваказского региона Российской Федерации».

• Герман Угрюмов (январь — май 2001)
• Анатолий Ежков (июнь 2001 — июль 2003)
• Юрий Мальцев (июль 2003 — сентябрь 2004)
• Аркадий Еделев (сентябрь 2004 — август 2006)

В 2006 году на базе РОШ создан Оперативный штаб Чеченской республики по проведению контртеррористической операции.

Командующие Объединённой группировкой войск (сил) по проведению контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации (с 1999 г.)

Объединённая группировка образована Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 23 сентября 1999 г. № 1255с «О мерах по повышению эффективности контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации».

• Виктор Казанцев (сентябрь 1999 — февраль 2000)
• Геннадий Трошев (и. о. февраль — март 2000^[27], командующий апрель — июнь 2000)
• Александр Баранов (и. о. март 2000^[27])
• Александр Баранов (и. о. июль — сентябрь 2000, командующий сентябрь 2000 — октябрь 2001, сентябрь 2003 — май 2004)
• Владимир Молтенской (и. о. май — август 2001^[28], командующий октябрь 2001 — сентябрь 2002)
• Сергей Макаров (и. о. июль — август 2002^[29], командующий октябрь 2002 — сентябрь 2003)
• Михаил Паньков (и. о. май 2004^[30])
• Вячеслав Дадонов (и. о. июнь 2004 — июль 2005^[30])
• Евгений Лазебин (июль 2005 — июнь 2006)
• Евгений Баряев (июнь — декабрь 2006)
• Яков Недобитко (декабрь 2006 — январь 2008)
• Николай Сивак (январь 2008 — август 2011)
• Сергей Меликов (сентябрь 2011 — май 2014)
• Сергей Власенко (с мая 2014)

Жертвы[править | править вики-текст]

В литературе, кино, музыке[править | править вики-текст]

Книги[править | править вики-текст]

• Александр Карасёв. Чеченские рассказы. — М.: Литературная Россия, 2008. — 320 с. — ISBN 978-5-7809-0114-3.
• Александр Карасёв. Предатель. — У.: Вагант, 2011. — 256 с. — ISBN 978-5-9635-0344-7.
• Полина Жеребцова. Дневник Жеребцовой Полины. — М.: Детектив-Пресс, 2011. — 576 с. — ISBN 978-5-89935-101-3.
• Полина Жеребцова. Муравей в стеклянной банке. Чеченские дневники 1994-2004 гг.. — М.: АСТ, 2014. — 608 с. — ISBN 978-5-17-083653-6.
• «Алхан-Юрт» (2006) — собрание повестей и рассказов Аркадия Бабченко.
• Грозненский роман (2009) — роман Константина Семёнова. Издавался также под названием «Нас предала Родина».
• «Миллион первый» (2005) — биография Джохара Дудаева, написанная его женой Аллой Дудаевой^[31]
• Тонкая серебристая нить (рассказы), (2015) — сборник рассказов Полины Жеребцовой, в котором отражена жизнь мирных жителей в городе Грозном в период чеченских войн.

Фильмы и сериалы[править | править вики-текст]

• Убойная сила-3: «Предел прочности» (4 серии) (2001)
• Мужская работа (8 серий) (2001)
• Спецназ (3 серии) (2002)
• Война — художественный фильм (2002)
• Кавказская рулетка — художественный фильм (2002)
• Марш славянки — художественный фильм (2002)
• Марш-бросок — художественный фильм (2003)
• Честь имею (4 серии) (2004)
• Господа офицеры (8 серий) (2004)
• Личный номер — художественный фильм (2004)
• Грозовые ворота (4 серии) (2006)
• Прорыв — художественный фильм (2006)
• Живой — художественный фильм (2006)
• Мёртвое поле — художественный фильм (2006)
• Александра — художественный фильм (2007)
• Русская жертва — художественный фильм (2008)
• Поиск — художественный фильм (2014)

Песни и музыка[править | править вики-текст]

Второй чеченской войне посвящены песни:

• «Любэ» — «После войны» (2000), «Солдат» (2000), Давай за… (2002)
• Юрий Шевчук — Звезда (2006), Дым (2009)
• Тимур Муцураев — «Хава Бараева» (взгляд со стороны боевиков)
• Игорь Растеряев — «Песня про Юру Прищепного» (2011)
• Сергей Тимошенко — «Горит Чечня»
• Сергей Тимошенко — «Памяти 131 Майкопской бригады»

См. также[править | править вики-текст]

• Хронология Второй чеченской войны
• Оперативный штаб Чеченской республики по проведению контртеррористической операции
• Список потерь российской авиации в Чечне (с 1999 г.)
• Список российских генералов, погибших на Северном Кавказе
• Чеченский конфликт
• Террористические акты, совершённые в России
• Исламистский терроризм на Северном Кавказе (с 2009)

Примечания[править | править вики-текст]

Ссылки[править | править вики-текст]

• Вторая чеченская война: Победа, которой не было (февраль 2000 — октябрь 2002)
• ↑ Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. Северо-Кавказский военный округ. Историческая справка(недоступная ссылка — история). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 22 марта 2007.

• ↑ Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. Федеральным силам в Чечне противостоят 22 тыс. боевиков.. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.

• ↑ Секретарь Союза комитетов солдатских матерей России Валентина Мельникова. Комитет солдатских матерей утверждает, что во второй чеченской войне погибли 12 000 человек (8 августа 2003). Проверено 1 января 2007. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Общество «Мемориал». Нарушение прав человека и норм гуманитарного права в ходе вооруженного конфликта в Чечне. Часть 3. Сентябрь–ноябрь 1999 года. Обстрелы и бомбардировки (2002). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Анна Политковская. Накрытый рынок. «Контртеррористическая операция» начиналась с чудовищного преступления (27 октября 2005). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Сайт «Чечня.ру». Хроника штурма Грозного (1999-2000 гг.) (3 марта 2006). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Геннадий Трошев. Моя война. Чеченский дневник окопного генерала. Кампания в горах. 1999-2000(недоступная ссылка — история). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 28 августа 2002.
• ↑ Мяло Ксения Григорьевна. Россия и последние войны XX века (1989-2000). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Юрий Щекочихин, заместитель председателя комитета по безопасности ГД РФ. Правда о гибели подмосковного ОМОНа (26 марта 2001). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ «Новый Регион – Пермь». Сегодня – пятая годовщина со дня гибели пермского отряда ОМОН (29 марта 2005). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Екатерина Минеева. Вчера стало известно, что взрыв в Аргуне в июле 2000 года — дело рук полевых командиров Хаттаба и Арби Бараева (18 июня 2002). Проверено 07 ноября 2006. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.
• ↑ Валерий Киселев. Нижегородцы на чеченской войне. Архивировано из первоисточника 18 февраля 2012.

• Кандидат военных наук Г. Ф. Кривошеев «Антитеррористическая операция на Северном Кавказе (август 1999—2000 г.)».
• Мониторинг событийно-информационной ситуации Второй чеченской войны.
• Авиация во Второй Чеченской Войне.
• Отлов и отстрел чеченских полевых командиров.
• Андрей Савельвев «Черная книга Чеченской войны (2000)».
• Контртеррористические операции в Ингушетии в 2003—2007 // РИА Новости, 25 января 2008.
• [4]
• Чечня: дорога к миру.
• Владимир Виноградов. Как я поехал на войну в Чечню (видео).
• Дневник Жеребцовой Полины (видео).

Вторая чеченская война (1999—2009)
Основные события	Статьи на тему	Федеральные силы	Сепаратисты
Взятие Гудермеса (1999) Бои за Грозный (1999—2000) Бои за Аргун (1999—2000) Убийство в Новых Алдах (2000) Бои за Шатой (2000) Бой у высоты 776 (2000) Засада на Сергиево-Посадский ОМОН (2000) Бои за Комсомольское (2000) Засада на Пермский ОМОН (2000) Засада на тыловую колонну 51-го Тульского парашютно-десантного полка (2000) Засада на колонну 99-й дивизии особого назначения ВВ МВД РФ (2000) Рейд на Ханкалу (2001) Рейд на Гудермес и уничтожение вертолёта с военной комиссией ГШ ВС РФ (2001) Бой под Галашками (2002) Рейд на Дагестан (2003—2004) Рейд на Ингушетию (2004) Рейд на Грозный (2004) Рейд на Беной-Ведено (2008)	Террористические акты Буйнакск (1999) Взрывы жилых домов (1999) Чечня (2000) Москва (2002) Грозный (2002) Взрывы на самолётах (2004) Беслан (2004) Нальчик (2005) Другое Чеченские террористки Нарушения прав человека во второй войне Убийство сотрудников Красного Креста в Чечне Убийство британских инженеров в Чечне Зачистка в Бороздиновской Кавказ-центр Этнические чистки в Чечне	Российская Федерация Российская армия (Сухопутные войска, Военно-воздушные силы, Воздушно-десантные войска, Морская пехота) МВД (ОМОН, Внутренние войска, СОБР, ГАИ) ФСБ (Пограничная служба) и ГРУ Специальные войска (Спецназ, ОСНАЗ)	Чеченская Республика Ичкерия Вооружённые формирования ЧРИ Исламский полк особого назначения Армия генерала Дудаева Шариатская гвардия ЧРИ Моджахеды: Иностранные наёмники  Кавказский эмират Исламское государство Дагестан Отдельная исламская территория «Кавказский фронт» Маджлисуль Шура Риядус-Салихийн Конгресс народов Ичкерии и Дагестана Исламская международная миротворческая бригада Террористический центр «Кавказ»

«Вторая чеченская война» – так называют контртеррористическую операцию на Северном Кавказе. По сути, она стала продолжением Первой чеченской войны 1994–1996 годов.

Причины войны

Первая чеченская война, завершившаяся Хасавюртовскими соглашениями, не принесла заметных улучшений на территорию Чечни. Период 1996–1999 годов в непризнанной республике вообще характеризуется глубокой криминализацией всей жизни. Федеральное правительство неоднократно обращалось к президенту Чечни А. Масхадову с предложением оказать помощь в борьбе с организованной преступностью, но понимания не находило.

Еще одним фактором, влияющим на обстановку в регионе, стало популярное религиозно-политическое течение – ваххабизм. Сторонники ваххабизма стали устанавливать власть ислама в аулах – со стычками и стрельбой. По сути, в 1998 году велась вялотекущая гражданская война, в которой участвовали сотни бойцов. Это течение в республике не поддерживалось администрацией, но и особого противодействия со стороны властей не испытывало. С каждым днем обстановка все больше обострялась.

В 1999 году боевики Басаева и Хаттаба попытались провести военную операцию в Дагестане, что и послужило основным поводом для начала новой войны. В то же самое время были проведены теракты в Буйнакске, Москве и Волгодонске.

Ход боевых действий

1999 год

2000 год

2009 год

Планируя вторжение на территорию Дагестана, боевики надеялись на поддержку местного населения, но оно оказало им отчаянное сопротивление. Федеральные власти предложили чеченскому руководству провести совместную операцию против исламистов в Дагестане. Также было предложено ликвидировать базы незаконных формирований.

За август 1999 года чеченские бандформирования были выбиты с территории Дагестана, началось их преследование федеральными войсками уже на территории Чечни. На некоторое время установилось относительное затишье.

Правительство Масхадова на словах осудило бандитов, но на деле никаких мер не принимало. Учитывая это, президент России Борис Ельцин подписал указ «О мерах по повышению эффективности контртеррористических операций на территории Северо-Кавказского региона Российской Федерации». Этот указ был направлен на уничтожение бандформирований и баз террористов в республике. 23 сентября федеральная авиация начала бомбардировку Грозного, а уже 30 сентября войска вошли на территорию Чечни.

Следует отметить, что за годы после Первой чеченской войны подготовка федеральной армии заметно выросла, и уже в ноябре войска подошли к Грозному.

Федеральное правительство также внесло коррективы в свои действия. На сторону федеральных сил перешел муфтий Ичкерии Ахмад Кадыров, который осудил ваххабизм и выступил против Масхадова.

26 декабря 1999 года началась операция по ликвидации бандформирований в Грозном. Бои продолжались весь январь 2000 года, и только 6 февраля было объявлено о полном освобождении города.

Части боевиков удалось вырваться из Грозного, и началась партизанская война. Активность боевых действий постепенно снижалась, и многие считали, что чеченский конфликт затих. Но в 2002–2005 годах боевики провели ряд жестоких и дерзких мер (захват заложников в Театральном центре на Дубровке, школы в Беслане, рейд в Кабардино-Балкарию). В дальнейшем ситуация практически стабилизировалась.

Итоги Второй чеченской войны

Главным итогом Второй чеченской войны можно считать достигнутое относительное спокойствие в Чеченской Республике. Был положен конец криминальному разгулу, терроризировавшему население в течение десяти лет. Была ликвидирована наркоторговля и работорговля. И очень важно, что на Кавказе не удалось реализовать планы исламистов по созданию мировых центров террористических организаций.

Сегодня, в годы правления Рамзана Кадырова, практически восстановилась экономическая структура республики. Было много сделано для устранения последствий военных действий. Город Грозный стал символом возрождения республики.